From fceeeda2115bcb86b992c4add38704a886c099c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2016 07:07:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Add secinfo for hotplug virtio disk

Commit id 'a1344f70a' added AES secret processing for RBD when starting
up a guest. As such, when the hotplug code calls qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare
an AES secret could be added to the disk about to be hotplugged. If an AES
secret was added, then the hotplug code would need to generate the secret
object because qemuBuildDriveStr would add the "password-secret=" to the
returned 'driveStr' rather than the base64 encoded password.

Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
---
 src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index f7cc13f977..9fc431bfda 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
                                  virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
 {
     int ret = -1;
+    int rv;
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
     virErrorPtr orig_err;
     char *devstr = NULL;
@@ -309,8 +310,12 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     char *drivealias = NULL;
     bool releaseaddr = false;
     bool driveAdded = false;
+    bool secobjAdded = false;
     virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
+    virJSONValuePtr secobjProps = NULL;
+    qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv;
+    qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr secinfo;
 
     if (!disk->info.type) {
         if (qemuDomainMachineIsS390CCW(vm->def) &&
@@ -343,6 +348,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     if (qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare(conn, priv, disk) < 0)
         goto error;
 
+    diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
+    secinfo = diskPriv->secinfo;
+    if (secinfo && secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES) {
+        if (qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(secinfo, &secobjProps) < 0)
+            goto error;
+    }
+
     if (!(drivestr = qemuBuildDriveStr(disk, false, priv->qemuCaps)))
         goto error;
 
@@ -357,6 +369,15 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
 
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
 
+    if (secobjProps) {
+        rv = qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret", secinfo->s.aes.alias,
+                                  secobjProps);
+        secobjProps = NULL; /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes */
+        if (rv < 0)
+            goto monitor_error;
+    }
+    secobjAdded = true;
+
     if (qemuMonitorAddDrive(priv->mon, drivestr) < 0)
         goto exit_monitor;
     driveAdded = true;
@@ -375,6 +396,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     ret = 0;
 
  cleanup:
+    virJSONValueFree(secobjProps);
     qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
     VIR_FREE(devstr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
@@ -388,10 +410,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
         VIR_WARN("Unable to remove drive %s (%s) after failed "
                  "qemuMonitorAddDevice", drivealias, drivestr);
     }
+    if (secobjAdded)
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, secinfo->s.aes.alias));
     if (orig_err) {
         virSetError(orig_err);
         virFreeError(orig_err);
     }
+
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
         releaseaddr = false;
 
@@ -2830,6 +2855,7 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
     char *drivestr;
+    char *objAlias = NULL;
 
     VIR_DEBUG("Removing disk %s from domain %p %s",
               disk->info.alias, vm, vm->def->name);
@@ -2840,7 +2866,27 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
                     QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, disk->info.alias) < 0)
         return -1;
 
+    /* Let's look for some markers for a secret object and create an alias
+     * object to be used to attempt to delete the object that was created.
+     * We cannot just use the disk private secret info since it would have
+     * been removed during cleanup of qemuProcessLaunch. Likewise, libvirtd
+     * restart wouldn't have them, so no assumption can be made. */
+    if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET) &&
+        qemuDomainSecretDiskCapable(disk->src)) {
+
+        if (!(objAlias = qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias))) {
+            VIR_FREE(drivestr);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+
+    /* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
+    if (objAlias)
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, objAlias));
+    VIR_FREE(objAlias);
+
     qemuMonitorDriveDel(priv->mon, drivestr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
-- 
2.39.5