Ian Jackson [Mon, 4 Jan 2016 14:45:12 +0000 (14:45 +0000)]
libxl: Rerun bison and flex
We are going to want to cherry pick a change to the bison input, which
will involve rerunning bison.
So firstly, update the bison and flex output to that from current
Debian wheezy (i386; 1:2.5.dfsg-2.1 and 2.5.35-10.1 respectively).
There should be no functional change since there is no change to the
source file, but we will inherit bugfixes and behavioural changes from
the new version of bison. So this is more a matter of hope than
knowledge.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich [Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:31:28 +0000 (14:31 +0100)]
x86/HVM: avoid reading ioreq state more than once
Otherwise, especially when the compiler chooses to translate the
switch() to a jump table, unpredictable behavior (and in the jump table
case arbitrary code execution) can result.
This is XSA-166.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: b452430a4cdfc801fa4bc391aed7522365e1deb6
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:46 +0100
David Vrabel [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:55:23 +0000 (15:55 +0100)]
evtchn: don't reuse ports that are still "busy"
When using the FIFO ABI a guest may close an event channel that is
still LINKED. If this port is reused, subsequent events may be lost
because they may become pending on the wrong queue.
This could be fixed by requiring guests to only close event channels
that are not linked. This is difficult since: a) irq cleanup in the
guest may be done in a context that cannot wait for the event to be
unlinked; b) the guest may attempt to rebind a PIRQ whose previous
close is still pending; and c) existing guests already have the
problematic behaviour.
Instead, simply check a port is not "busy" (i.e., it's not linked)
before reusing it.
Guests should still drain any queues for VCPUs that are being
offlined, or the port will become unusable until the VCPU is onlined
and starts processing events again.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 78e24c269b0a4a8b864ece725e6d4209ed95dfa7
master date: 2015-12-02 15:21:46 +0100
Daniel Kiper [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:55:00 +0000 (15:55 +0100)]
x86/boot: check for not allowed sections before linking
Currently check for not allowed sections is performed just after
compilation. However, if compilation succeeds and check fails then
second build will create xen.gz/xen.efi without any visible error.
This happens because %.o: %.c recipe created object file during first
run and make do not execute this recipe during second run. So, look
for not allowed sections before linking. This way check will be
executed every time.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: d380b3559734739ae009cd3c0e9aabb5602863e2
master date: 2015-11-25 17:24:36 +0100
Jan Beulich [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:53:12 +0000 (15:53 +0100)]
VMX: fix/adjust trap injection
In the course of investigating the 4.1.6 backport issue of the XSA-156
patch I realized that #DB injection has always been broken, but with it
now getting always intercepted the problem has got worse: Documentation
clearly states that neither DR7.GD nor DebugCtl.LBR get cleared before
the intercept, so this is something we need to do before reflecting the
intercepted exception.
While adjusting this (and also with 4.1.6's strange use of
X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_EXCEPTION for #DB in mind) I further realized that
the special casing of individual vectors shouldn't be done for
software interrupts (resulting from INT $nn).
And then some code movement: Setting of CR2 for #PF can be done in the
same switch() statement (no need for a separate if()), and reading of
intr_info is better done close the the consumption of the variable
(allowing the compiler to generate better code / use fewer registers
for variables).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 81a28f14009f4d8577a81b28dd06f6828112054b
master date: 2015-11-24 12:30:31 +0100
Dario Faggioli [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:52:51 +0000 (15:52 +0100)]
sched: fix locking for insert_vcpu() in credit1 and RTDS
The insert_vcpu() hook is handled with inconsistent locking.
In fact, schedule_cpu_switch() calls the hook with runqueue
lock held, while sched_move_domain() relies on the hook
implementations to take the lock themselves (and, since that
is not done in Credit1 and RTDS, such operation is not safe
in those cases).
This is fixed as follows:
- take the lock in the hook implementations, in specific
schedulers' code;
- avoid calling insert_vcpu(), for the idle vCPU, in
schedule_cpu_switch(). In fact, idle vCPUs are set to run
immediately, and the various schedulers won't insert them
in their runqueues anyway, even when explicitly asked to.
While there, still in schedule_cpu_switch(), locking with
_irq() is enough (there's no need to do *_irqsave()).
Jan Beulich [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:48:44 +0000 (15:48 +0100)]
x86/NUMA: fix SRAT table processor entry parsing and consumption
- don't overrun apicid_to_node[] (possible in the x2APIC case)
- don't limit number of processor related SRAT entries we can consume
- make acpi_numa_{processor,x2apic}_affinity_init() as similar to one
another as possible
- print APIC IDs in hex (to ease matching with other log messages), at
once making legacy and x2APIC ones distinguishable (by width)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 83281fc9b31396e94c0bfb6550b75c165037a0ad
master date: 2015-10-14 12:46:27 +0200
Jan Beulich [Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:47:26 +0000 (15:47 +0100)]
VT-d: don't suppress invalidation address write when it is zero
GFN zero is a valid address, and hence may need invalidation done for
it just like for any other GFN.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
master commit: 710942e57fb42ff8f344ca82f6b678f67e38ae63
master date: 2015-10-12 15:58:35 +0200
Jan Beulich [Wed, 9 Dec 2015 12:56:40 +0000 (13:56 +0100)]
memory: fix XSA-158 fix
For one the uses of domu_max_order and ptdom_max_order were swapped.
And then gcc warns about an unused result of a __must_check function
in the control part of a conditional expression when both other
expressions can be determined by the compiler to produce the same value
(see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=68039), which happens
when HAS_PASSTHROUGH is undefined (i.e. for ARM on 4.4 and older).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: ff841cead287d7913901ba5c4e7628a6958b5bea
master date: 2015-12-09 13:53:13 +0100
Ian Jackson [Wed, 18 Nov 2015 15:34:54 +0000 (15:34 +0000)]
libxl: Fix bootloader-related virtual memory leak on pv build failure
The bootloader may call libxl__file_reference_map(), which mmap's the
pv_kernel and pv_ramdisk into process memory. This was only unmapped,
however, on the success path of libxl__build_pv(). If there were a
failure anywhere between libxl_bootloader.c:parse_bootloader_result()
and the end of libxl__build_pv(), the calls to
libxl__file_reference_unmap() would be skipped, leaking the mapped
virtual memory.
Ideally this would be fixed by adding the unmap calls to the
destruction path for libxl__domain_build_state. Unfortunately the
lifetime of the libxl__domain_build_state is opaque, and it doesn't
have a proper destruction path. But, the only thing in it that isn't
from the gc are these bootloader references, and they are only ever
set for one libxl__domain_build_state, the one which is
libxl__domain_create_state.build_state.
So we can clean up in the exit path from libxl__domain_create_*, which
always comes through domcreate_complete.
Remove the now-redundant unmaps in libxl__build_pv's success path.
This is XSA-160.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Tested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Jan Beulich [Tue, 8 Dec 2015 13:11:08 +0000 (14:11 +0100)]
memory: fix XENMEM_exchange error handling
assign_pages() can fail due to the domain getting killed in parallel,
which should not result in a hypervisor crash.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Also delete a redundant put_gfn() - all relevant paths leading to the
"fail" label already do this (and there are also paths where it was
plain wrong). All of the put_gfn()-s got introduced by 51032ca058
("Modify naming of queries into the p2m"), including the otherwise
unneeded initializer for k (with even a kind of misleading comment -
the compiler warning could actually have served as a hint that the use
is wrong).
This is CVE-2015-8339 + CVE-2015-8340 / XSA-159.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: eedecb3cf0b2ce1ffc2eb08f3c73f88d42c382c9
master date: 2015-12-08 14:01:43 +0100
Ian Campbell [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:31:34 +0000 (14:31 +0100)]
Config: Switch to unified qemu trees.
Upstream qemu is now in qemu-xen.git and the trad fork is in
qemu-xen-traditional.git.
QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION is currently a tag and
QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION is a specific revision, so no changes are
required to those.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Conflicts:
Config.mk Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 78833c04250416f1870c458309d3ac0e5cf915fd)
Jan Beulich [Tue, 10 Nov 2015 11:22:25 +0000 (12:22 +0100)]
x86/HVM: always intercept #AC and #DB
Both being benign exceptions, and both being possible to get triggered
by exception delivery, this is required to prevent a guest from locking
up a CPU (resulting from no other VM exits occurring once getting into
such a loop).
The specific scenarios:
1) #AC may be raised during exception delivery if the handler is set to
be a ring-3 one by a 32-bit guest, and the stack is misaligned.
This is CVE-2015-5307 / XSA-156.
Reported-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
2) #DB may be raised during exception delivery when a breakpoint got
placed on a data structure involved in delivering the exception. This
can result in an endless loop when a 64-bit guest uses a non-zero IST
for the vector 1 IDT entry, but even without use of IST the time it
takes until a contributory fault would get raised (results depending
on the handler) may be quite long.
This is CVE-2015-8104 / XSA-156.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: bd2239d9fa975a1ee5bcd27c218ae042cd0a57bc
master date: 2015-11-10 12:03:08 +0100
Ian Jackson [Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:18:30 +0000 (16:18 +0100)]
libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too
PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
stable even under memory pressure.
There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
PoD guests).
This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
probably also in stable trees.
Jan Beulich [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:15:22 +0000 (14:15 +0100)]
x86: rate-limit logging in do_xen{oprof,pmu}_op()
Some of the sub-ops are acessible to all guests, and hence should be
rate-limited. In the xenoprof case, just like for XSA-146, include them
only in debug builds. Since the vPMU code is rather new, allow them to
be always present, but downgrade them to (rate limited) guest messages.
This is CVE-2015-7971 / XSA-152.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 95e7415843b94c346e5ba8682665f508f220e04b
master date: 2015-10-29 13:37:19 +0100
Andrew Cooper [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:14:30 +0000 (14:14 +0100)]
x86/PoD: Eager sweep for zeroed pages
Based on the contents of a guests physical address space,
p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() could degrade into a linear memcmp() from 0 to
max_gfn, which runs non-preemptibly.
As p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() runs behind the scenes in a number of contexts,
making it preemptible is not feasible.
Instead, a different approach is taken. Recently-populated pages are eagerly
checked for reclaimation, which amortises the p2m_pod_emergency_sweep()
operation across each p2m_pod_demand_populate() operation.
Note that in the case that a 2M superpage can't be reclaimed as a superpage,
it is shattered if 4K pages of zeros can be reclaimed. This is unfortunate
but matches the previous behaviour, and is required to avoid regressions
(domain crash from PoD exhaustion) with VMs configured close to the limit.
This is CVE-2015-7970 / XSA-150.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 101ce53266866144e724ed593173bc4098b300b9
master date: 2015-10-29 13:36:25 +0100
Ian Campbell [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:09:45 +0000 (14:09 +0100)]
xen: common: Use unbounded array for symbols_offset.
Using a singleton array causes gcc5 to report:
symbols.c: In function 'symbols_lookup':
symbols.c:128:359: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
symbols.c:136:176: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3f82ea62826d4eb06002d8dba475bafcc454b845
master date: 2015-03-20 12:02:03 +0000
Jan Beulich [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:07:01 +0000 (14:07 +0100)]
x86: guard against undue super page PTE creation
When optional super page support got added (commit bd1cd81d64 "x86: PV
support for hugepages"), two adjustments were missed: mod_l2_entry()
needs to consider the PSE and RW bits when deciding whether to use the
fast path, and the PSE bit must not be removed from L2_DISALLOW_MASK
unconditionally.
This is CVE-2015-7835 / XSA-148.
Reported-by: "栾尚聪(好风)" <shangcong.lsc@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: fe360c90ea13f309ef78810f1a2b92f2ae3b30b8
master date: 2015-10-29 13:35:07 +0100
Ian Campbell [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:06:35 +0000 (14:06 +0100)]
arm: handle races between relinquish_memory and free_domheap_pages
Primarily this means XENMEM_decrease_reservation from a toolstack
domain.
Unlike x86 we have no requirement right now to queue such pages onto
a separate list, if we hit this race then the other code has already
fully accepted responsibility for freeing this page and therefore
there is no more for relinquish_memory to do.
This is CVE-2015-7814 / XSA-147.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 1ef01396fdff88b1c3331a09ca5c69619b90f4ea
master date: 2015-10-29 13:34:17 +0100
Julien Grall [Thu, 29 Oct 2015 13:05:07 +0000 (14:05 +0100)]
arm: Support hypercall_create_continuation for multicall
Multicall for ARM has been supported since commit f0dbdc6 "xen: arm: fully
implement multicall interface.". Although, if an hypercall in multicall
requires preemption, it will crash the host:
Ian Campbell [Tue, 6 Oct 2015 08:42:35 +0000 (09:42 +0100)]
docs: xl.cfg: permissive option is not PV only.
Since XSA-131 qemu-xen has defaulted to non-permissive mode and the
option was extended to cover that case in 015a373351e5 "tools: libxl:
allow permissive qemu-upstream pci passthrough".
Since I was rewrapping to adjust the text anyway I've split the safety
warning into a separate paragraph to make it more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Eric <epretorious@yahoo.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7f25baba1c0942e50757f4ecb233202dbbc057b9)
Since XSA-131 qemu-xen now restricts access to PCI cfg by default. In
order to allow local configuration of the existing libxl_device_pci
"permissive" flag needs to be plumbed through via the new QMP property
added by the XSA-131 patches.
Versions of QEMU prior to XSA-131 did not support this permissive
property, so we only pass it if it is true. Older versions only
supported permissive mode.
qemu-xen-traditional already supports the permissive mode setting via
xenstore.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 015a373351e5c3553f848324ac0f07a9d92883fa)
Ian Jackson [Thu, 27 Feb 2014 17:46:49 +0000 (17:46 +0000)]
tools/console: xenconsole tolerate tty errors
Since 28d386fc4341 (XSA-57), libxl writes an empty value for the
console tty node, with read-only permission for the guest, when
setting up pv console "frontends". (The actual tty value is later set
by xenconsoled.) Writing an empty node is not strictly necessary to
stop the frontend from writing dangerous values here, but it is a good
belt-and-braces approach.
Unfortunately this confuses xenconsole. It reads the empty value, and
tries to open it as the tty. xenconsole then exits.
Fix this by having xenconsole treat an empty value the same way as no
value at all.
Also, make the error opening the tty be nonfatal: we just print a
warning, but do not exit. I think this is helpful in theoretical
situations where xenconsole is racing with libxl and/or xenconsoled.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
v2: Combine two conditions and move the free
(cherry picked from commit 39ba2989b10b6a1852e253b204eb010f8e7026f1)
Jan Beulich [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:46:39 +0000 (12:46 +0200)]
x86/p2m-pt: correct condition of IOMMU mapping updates
Whether the MFN changes does not depend on the new entry being valid
(but solely on the old one).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 660fd65d5578a95ec5eac522128bba23325179eb
master date: 2015-10-02 13:40:36 +0200
Dario Faggioli [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:46:06 +0000 (12:46 +0200)]
credit1: fix tickling when it happens from a remote pCPU
especially if that is also from a different cpupool than the
processor of the vCPU that triggered the tickling.
In fact, it is possible that we get as far as calling vcpu_unblock()-->
vcpu_wake()-->csched_vcpu_wake()-->__runq_tickle() for the vCPU 'vc',
but all while running on a pCPU that is different from 'vc->processor'.
For instance, this can happen when an HVM domain runs in a cpupool,
with a different scheduler than the default one, and issues IOREQs
to Dom0, running in Pool-0 with the default scheduler.
In fact, right in this case, the following crash can be observed:
In this case, pCPU 7 is not in Pool-0, while the (Dom0's) vCPU being
woken is. pCPU's 7 pool has a different scheduler than credit, but it
is, however, right from pCPU 7 that we are waking the Dom0's vCPUs.
Therefore, the current code tries to access csched_balance_mask for
pCPU 7, but that is not defined, and hence the Oops.
(Note that, in case the two pools run the same scheduler we see no
Oops, but things are still conceptually wrong.)
Cure things by making the csched_balance_mask macro accept a
parameter for fetching a specific pCPU's mask (instead than always
using smp_processor_id()).
Quan Xu [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:44:27 +0000 (12:44 +0200)]
vt-d: fix IM bit mask and unmask of Fault Event Control Register
Bit 0:29 in Fault Event Control Register are 'Reserved and Preserved',
software cannot write 0 to it unconditionally. Software must preserve
the value read for writes.
Signed-off-by: Quan Xu <quan.xu@intel.com> Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
vt-d: fix IM bit unmask of Fault Event Control Register in init_vtd_hw()
Bit 0:29 in Fault Event Control Register are 'Reserved and Preserved',
software cannot write 0 to it unconditionally. Software must preserve
the value read for writes.
xen/xsm: Make p->policyvers be a local variable (ver) to shut up GCC 5.1.1 warnings.
policydb.c: In function ‘user_read’:
policydb.c:1443:26: error: ‘buf[2]’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Which (as Andrew mentioned) is because GCC cannot assume
that 'p->policyvers' has the same value between checks.
We make it local, optimize the name to 'ver' and the warnings go away.
We also update another call site with this modification to
make it more inline with the rest of the functions.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
master commit: 6a2f81459e1455d65a9a6f78dd2a0d0278619680
master date: 2015-09-22 12:09:03 -0400
Andrew Cooper [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:43:18 +0000 (12:43 +0200)]
x86/sysctl: don't clobber memory if NCAPINTS > ARRAY_SIZE(pi->hw_cap)
There is no current problem, as both NCAPINTS and pi->hw_cap are 8 entries,
but the limit should be calculated appropriately so as to avoid hypervisor
stack corruption if the two do get out of sync.
Jan Beulich [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:42:16 +0000 (12:42 +0200)]
x86/p2m: fix mismatched unlock
Luckily, due to gfn_unlock() currently mapping to p2m_unlock(), this is
only a cosmetic issue right now.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 1f180822ad3fe83fe293393ec175f14ded98f082
master date: 2015-09-14 13:39:19 +0200
Kouya Shimura [Thu, 8 Oct 2015 10:41:22 +0000 (12:41 +0200)]
x86/hvm: fix saved pmtimer and hpet values
The ACPI PM timer is sometimes broken on live migration.
Since vcpu->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_time is always zero in other than
"delay for missed ticks mode". Even in "delay for missed ticks mode",
vcpu's guest_time field is not valid (i.e. zero) when
the state of vcpu is "blocked". (see pt_save_timer function)
The original author (Tim Deegan) of pmtimer_save() must have intended
that it saves the last scheduled time of the vcpu. Unfortunately it was
already implied this bug. FYI, there is no other timer mode than
"delay for missed ticks mode" then.
For consistency with HPET, pmtimer_save() should refer hvm_get_guest_time()
to update the counter as well as hpet_save() does.
Without this patch, the clock of windows server 2012R2 without HPET
might leap forward several minutes on live migration.
Signed-off-by: Kouya Shimura <kouya@jp.fujitsu.com>
Retain use of ->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_time when non-zero. Do the inverse
adjustment for vHPET.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Kouya Shimura <kouya@jp.fujitsu.com>
master commit: 244582a01dcb49fa30083725964a066937cc94f2
master date: 2015-09-11 16:24:56 +0200
The current libxl code doesn't deal with read-only drives at all.
Upstream QEMU and qemu-xen only support read-only cdrom drives: make
sure to specify "readonly=on" for cdrom drives and return error in case
the user requested a non-cdrom read-only drive.
This is XSA-142, discovered by Lin Liu
(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1257893).
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Backport to Xen 4.5 and earlier, apropos of report and review from
Michael Young.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Anthony PERARD [Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:09:13 +0000 (16:09 +0100)]
libxl: Increase device model startup timeout to 1min.
On a busy host, QEMU may take more than 10s to load and start.
This is likely due to a bug in Linux where the I/O subsystem sometime
produce high latency under load and result in QEMU taking a long time to
load every single dynamic libraries.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9acfbe14d7261b03e3b3f4dc3c850ba2a7093e1f)
Jan Beulich [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:58:41 +0000 (15:58 +0200)]
x86/NUMA: make init_node_heap() respect Xen heap limit
On NUMA systems, where we try to use node local memory for the basic
control structures of the buddy allocator, this special case needs to
take into consideration a possible address width limit placed on the
Xen heap. In turn this (but also other, more abstract considerations)
requires that xenheap_max_mfn() not be called more than once (at most
we might permit it to be called a second time with a larger value than
was passed the first time), and be called only before calling
end_boot_allocator().
While inspecting all the involved code, a couple of off-by-one issues
were found (and are being corrected here at once):
- arch_init_memory() cleared one too many page table slots
- the highmem_start based invocation of xenheap_max_mfn() passed too
big a value
- xenheap_max_mfn() calculated the wrong bit count in edge cases
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen/arm64: do not (incorrectly) limit size of xenheap
The xenheap bits variable is used to know the last RAM MFN always mapped
in Xen virtual memory. If the value is 0, it means that all the memory is
always mapped in Xen virtual memory.
On X-gene the RAM bank resides above 128GB and last xenheap MFN is
0x4400000. With the new way to calculate the number of bits, xenheap_bits
will be equal to 38 bits. This will result to hide all the RAM and the
impossibility to allocate xenheap memory.
Given that aarch64 have always all the memory mapped in Xen virtual
memory, it's not necessary to call xenheap_max_mfn which set the number
of bits.
mm: populate_physmap: validate correctly the gfn for direct mapped domain
Direct mapped domain has already the memory allocated 1:1, so we are
directly using the gfn as mfn to map the RAM in the guest.
While we are validating that the page associated to the first mfn belongs to
the domain, the subsequent MFN are not validated when the extent_order
is > 0.
This may result to map memory region (MMIO, RAM) which doesn't belong to the
domain.
Although, only DOM0 on ARM is using a direct memory mapped. So it
doesn't affect any guest (at least on the upstream version) or even x86.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 9503ab0e9c6a41a1ee7a70c8ea9313d08ebaa8c5
master date: 2015-08-13 14:41:09 +0200
A domain with sufficient shadow allocation can cause a watchdog timeout
during domain destruction. Expand the existing -EAGAIN logic in
paging_teardown() to allow {hap/sh}_set_allocation() to become
restartable during the DOMCTL_destroydomain hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Anshul Makkar <anshul.makkar@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 0174da5b79752e2d5d6ca0faed89536e8f3d91c7
master date: 2015-08-06 10:04:43 +0100
Jan Beulich [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:54:13 +0000 (15:54 +0200)]
x86/NUMA: don't account hotplug regions
... except in cases where they really matter: node_memblk_range[] now
is the only place all regions get stored. nodes[] and NODE_DATA() track
present memory only. This improves the reporting when nodes have
disjoint "normal" and hotplug regions, with the hotplug region sitting
above the highest populated page. In such cases a node's spanned-pages
value (visible in both XEN_SYSCTL_numainfo and 'u' debug key output)
covered all the way up to top of populated memory, giving quite
different a picture from what an otherwise identically configured
system without and hotplug regions would report. Note, however, that
the actual hotplug case (as well as cases of nodes with multiple
disjoint present regions) is still not being handled such that the
reported values would represent how much memory a node really has (but
that can be considered intentional).
Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
This at once makes nodes_cover_memory() no longer consider E820_RAM
regions covered by SRAT hotplug regions.
Also reject self-overlaps with mismatching hotplug flags.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
master commit: c011f470e6e79208f5baa071b4d072b78c88e2ba
master date: 2015-08-31 13:52:24 +0200
Jan Beulich [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:53:37 +0000 (15:53 +0200)]
x86/NUMA: fix setup_node()
The function referenced an __initdata object (nodes_found). Since this
being a node mask was more complicated than needed, the variable gets
replaced by a simple counter. Check at once that the count of nodes
doesn't go beyond MAX_NUMNODES.
Also consolidate three printk()s related to the function's use into just
one.
Finally (quite the opposite of the above issue) __init-annotate
nodes_cover_memory().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 8f945d36d9bddd5b589ba23c7322b30d623dd084
master date: 2015-08-31 13:51:52 +0200
Jan Beulich [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:51:56 +0000 (15:51 +0200)]
x86/IO-APIC: don't create pIRQ mapping from masked RTE
While moving our XenoLinux patches to 4.2-rc I noticed bogus "already
mapped" messages resulting from Linux (legitimately) writing RTEs with
only the mask bit set. Clearly we shouldn't even attempt to create a
pIRQ <-> IRQ mapping from such RTEs.
In the course of this I also found that the respective message isn't
really useful without also printing the pre-existing mapping. And I
noticed that map_domain_pirq() allowed IRQ0 to get through, despite us
never allowing a domain to control that interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 669d4b85c433674ab3b52ef707af0d3a551c941f
master date: 2015-08-25 16:18:31 +0200
x86, amd_ucode: skip microcode updates for final levels
Some of older[Fam10h] systems require that certain number of
applied microcode patch levels should not be overwritten by
the microcode loader. Otherwise, system hangs are known to occur.
The 'final_levels' of patch ids have been obtained empirically.
Refer bug https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=913996
for details of the issue.
The short version is that people have predominantly noticed
system hang issues when trying to update microcode levels
beyond the patch IDs below.
[0x01000098, 0x0100009f, 0x010000af]
From internal discussions, we gathered that OS/hypervisor
cannot reliably perform microcode updates beyond these levels
due to hardware issues. Therefore, we need to abort microcode
update process if we hit any of these levels.
In this patch, we check for those microcode versions and abort
if the current core has one of those final patch levels applied
by the BIOS
A linux version of the patch has already made it into tip-
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=143703405627170
Signed-off-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
master commit: 22c5675877c8209adcfdb6bceddb561320374529
master date: 2015-08-25 16:17:13 +0200
Andrew Cooper [Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:49:59 +0000 (15:49 +0200)]
x86/gdt: Drop write-only, xalloc()'d array from set_gdt()
It is not used, and can cause a spurious failure of the set_gdt() hypercall in
low memory situations.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: a7bd9b1661304500cd18b7d216d616ecf053ebdb
master date: 2015-08-05 10:32:45 +0100
Julien Grall [Thu, 13 Aug 2015 11:03:43 +0000 (12:03 +0100)]
xen/arm: mm: Do not dump the p2m when mapping a foreign gfn
The physmap operation XENMAPSPACE_gfmn_foreign is dumping the p2m when
an error occured by calling dump_p2m_lookup. But this function is not
using ratelimited printk.
Any domain able to map foreign gfmn would be able to flood the Xen
console.
The information wasn't not useful so drop it.
This is XSA-141.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit afc13fe5e21d18c09e44f8ae6f7f4484e9f1de7f)
It can happen that an fd is deregistered, and closed, and then a new
fd opened, and reregistered, all while another thread is in poll().
If this happens poll might report POLLNVAL, but the event loop would
think that the fd was supposed to have been valid, and then fail an
assertion:
libxl_event.c:1183: afterpoll_check_fd: Assertion `poller->fds_changed || !(fds[slot].revents & 0x020)' failed.
We can't simply ignore POLLNVAL because if we have bugs which cause
messed-up fds, it is a serious problem which we really need to detect.
Instead, add extra tracking to spot when this possibility arises, and
abort on POLLNVAL if we are sure that it is unexpected.
Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 681ce1681622a46d111cfdc4fc07e4cb565ae131)
Ian Jackson [Thu, 9 Jul 2015 16:05:07 +0000 (17:05 +0100)]
libxl: poll: Use poller_get and poller_put for poller_app
This makes the code more regular. We are going to want to do some
more work in poller_get and poller_put, which work also wants to be
done for poller_app.
Two very minor functional changes:
* We call malloc an extra time since poller_app is now a pointer
* ERROR_FAIL on poller_get failing for poller_app is generated in
libxl_ctx_init rather than passed through by libxl_poller_init
from libxl__pipe_nonblock.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit aae37652067eafd0f2b85050306772df0cb71f08)
Ian Jackson [Thu, 9 Jul 2015 15:52:02 +0000 (16:52 +0100)]
libxl: poll: Make libxl__poller_get have only one success return path
In preparation for doing some more work on successful exit.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6fc946bc5520ebdbba5cbae4d49e53895df8b393)
(cherry picked from commit 8c409135e69c7321cb6d82b8cae0868a81d05ddc)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl_event.c Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
libxl: In libxl_set_vcpuonline check for maximum number of VCPUs against the cpumap.
There is no sense in trying to online (or offline) CPUs when the size of
cpumap is greater than the maximum number of VCPUs the guest can go to.
As such fail the operation if the count of CPUs to online is greater
than what the guest started with. For the offline case we do not
check (as the bits are unset in the cpumap) and let it go through.
We coalesce some of the underlying libxl_set_vcpuonline code
together which was duplicated in QMP and XenStore codepaths.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit d83bf9d224eeb5b73b93c2703f7dba4473cfa89c)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl.c Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0d8cbcad03764e42ff2f0d224aff883c3734d782)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl.c Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Ian Campbell [Wed, 19 Nov 2014 10:42:18 +0000 (10:42 +0000)]
docs: workaround markdown parser error in xen-command-line.markdown
Some versions of markdown (specifically the one in Debian Wheezy, currently
used to generate
http://xenbits.xen.org/docs/unstable/misc/xen-command-line.html) seem to be
confused by nested lists in the middle of multi-paragraph parent list entries
as seen in the com1,com2 entry.
The effect is that the "Default" section of all following entries are replace
by some sort of hash or checksum (at least, a string of 32 random seeming hex
digits).
Workaround this issue by making the decriptions of the DPS options a nested
list, moving the existing nested list describing the options for S into a third
level list. This seems to avoid the issue, and is arguably better formatting in
its own right (at least its not a regression IMHO)
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae325e94d2076f3953824e069c062908221f7325)
Ian Jackson [Mon, 15 Jun 2015 13:50:42 +0000 (14:50 +0100)]
xl: Sane handling of extra config file arguments
Various xl sub-commands take additional parameters containing = as
additional config fragments.
The handling of these config fragments has a number of bugs:
1. Use of a static 1024-byte buffer. (If truncation would occur,
with semi-trusted input, a security risk arises due to quotes
being lost.)
2. Mishandling of the return value from snprintf, so that if
truncation occurs, the to-write pointer is updated with the
wanted-to-write length, resulting in stack corruption. (This is
XSA-137.)
3. Clone-and-hack of the code for constructing the appended
config file.
These are fixed here, by introducing a new function
`string_realloc_append' and using it everywhere. The `extra_info'
buffers are replaced by pointers, which start off NULL and are
explicitly freed on all return paths.
The separate variable which will become dom_info.extra_config is
abolished (which involves moving the clearing of dom_info).
Additional bugs I observe, not fixed here:
4. The functions which now call string_realloc_append use ad-hoc
error returns, with multiple calls to `return'. This currently
necessitates multiple new calls to `free'.
5. Many of the paths in xl call exit(-rc) where rc is a libxl status
code. This is a ridiculous exit status `convention'.
6. The loops for handling extra config data are clone-and-hacks.
7. Once the extra config buffer is accumulated, it must be combined
with the appropriate main config file. The code to do this
combining is clone-and-hacked too.
Elena Ufimtseva [Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:19:52 +0000 (11:19 +0200)]
dmar: device scope mem leak fix
Release memory allocated for scope.devices dmar units on various
failure paths and when disabling dmar. Set device count after
sucessfull memory allocation, not before, in device scope parsing function.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
# Commit 132231d10343608faf5892785a08acc500326d04
# Date 2015-07-16 15:23:37 +0200
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
dmar: fix double free in error paths following c/s a8bc99b
Several error paths would end up freeing scope->devices twice.
Jan Beulich [Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:19:20 +0000 (11:19 +0200)]
make rangeset_report_ranges() report all ranges
find_range() returns NULL when s is below the lowest range, so we have
to use first_range() here (which is as good performance wise), or else
no range gets reported at all in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: b1c780cd315eb4db06be3bbb5c6d80b1cabd27a9
master date: 2015-07-15 16:11:42 +0200
Ian Campbell [Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:18:33 +0000 (11:18 +0200)]
xen: earlycpio: Pull in latest linux earlycpio.[ch]
AFAICT our current version does not correspond to any version in the
Linux history. This commit resynchronised to the state in Linux
commit 598bae70c2a8e35c8d39b610cca2b32afcf047af.
Differences from upstream: find_cpio_data is __init, printk instead of
pr_*.
This appears to fix Debian bug #785187. "Appears" because my test box
happens to be AMD and the issue is that the (valid) cpio generated by
the Intel ucode is not liked by the old Xen code. I've tested by
hacking the hypervisor to look for the Intel path.
Reported-by: Stephan Seitz <stse+debianbugs@fsing.rootsland.net> Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Stephan Seitz <stse+debianbugs@fsing.rootsland.net> Cc: 785187@bugs.debian.org Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 39c6664a0e6e1b4ed80660d545dff34ce41bee31
master date: 2015-07-07 15:10:45 +0100
Andrew Cooper [Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:18:09 +0000 (11:18 +0200)]
x86/hvmloader: avoid data corruption with xenstore reads/writes
The functions ring_read and ring_write() have logic to try and deal with
partial reads and writes.
However, in all cases where the "while (len)" loop executed twice, data
corruption would occur as the second memcpy() starts from the beginning of
"data" again, rather than from where it got to.
This bug manifested itself as protocol corruption when a reply header crossed
the first wrap of the response ring. However, similar corruption would also
occur if hvmloader observed xenstored performing partial writes of the block
in question, or if hvmloader had to wait for xenstored to make space in either
ring.
Reported-by: Adam Kucia <djexit@o2.pl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: bbbe7e7157a964c485fb861765be291734676932
master date: 2015-07-07 14:39:27 +0200
credit1: properly deal with pCPUs not in any cpupool
Ideally, the pCPUs that are 'free', i.e., not assigned
to any cpupool, should not be considred by the scheduler
for load balancing or anything. In Credit1, we fail at
this, because of how we use cpupool_scheduler_cpumask().
In fact, for a free pCPU, cpupool_scheduler_cpumask()
returns a pointer to cpupool_free_cpus, and hence, near
the top of csched_load_balance():
if ( unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, online)) )
goto out;
is false (the pCPU _is_ free!), and we therefore do not
jump to the end right away, as we should. This, causes
the following splat when resuming from ACPI S3 with
pCPUs not assigned to any pool:
The cure is:
* use cpupool_online_cpumask(), as a better guard to the
case when the cpu is being offlined;
* explicitly check whether the cpu is free.
SEDF is in a similar situation, so fix it too.
Still in Credit1, we must make sure that free (or offline)
CPUs are not considered "ticklable". Not doing so would impair
the load balancing algorithm, making the scheduler think that
it is possible to 'ask' the pCPU to pick up some work, while
in reallity, that will never happen! Evidence of such behavior
is shown in this trace:
Name CPU list
Pool-0 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
x86 / cpupool: clear the proper cpu_valid bit on pCPU teardown
In fact, when a pCPU goes down, we want to clear its
bit in the correct cpupool's valid mask, rather than
always in cpupool0's one.
Before this commit, all the pCPUs in the non-default
pool(s) will be considered immediately valid, during
system resume, even the one that have not been brought
up yet. As a result, the (Credit1) scheduler will attempt
to run its load balancing logic on them, causing the
following Oops:
The reason why the error is a #GP fault is that, without
this commit, we try to access the per-cpu area of a not
yet allocated and initialized pCPU.
In fact, %rax, which is what is used as pointer, is 80007d2f7fccb780, and we also have this:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e4e9d2d4e76bd8fe229c124bd57fc6ba824271b3
master date: 2015-07-07 11:37:26 +0200
Liang Li [Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:15:35 +0000 (11:15 +0200)]
nested EPT: fix the handling of nested EPT
If the host EPT entry is changed, the nested EPT should be updated.
the current code does not do this, and it's wrong.
I have tested this patch, the L2 guest can boot and run as normal.
Signed-off-by: Liang Li <liang.z.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com> Reported-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 71bb7304e7a7a35ea6df4b0cedebc35028e4c159
master date: 2015-06-30 15:00:54 +0100
Andrew Cooper [Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:05:58 +0000 (14:05 +0200)]
x86/traps: avoid using current too early on boot
Early on boot, current has the sentinel value 0xfffff000. Blindly using it in
show_registers() causes a nested failure and no useful information printed
from an early crash.
Ross Lagerwall [Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:04:58 +0000 (14:04 +0200)]
x86: avoid tripping watchdog when constructing dom0
Constructing dom0 may take a few seconds, particularly if the slow VESA
graphics terminal is used. Process pending softirqs a few times to avoid
tripping a watchdog with a short timeout.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Move inclusion of xen/softirq.h (and at once clean up other includes).
Jan Beulich [Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:02:46 +0000 (14:02 +0200)]
kexec: add more pages to v1 environment
Destination pages need mappings to be added to the page tables in the
v1 case (where nothing else calls machine_kexec_add_page() for them).
Further, without the tools mapping the low 1Mb (expected by at least
some Linux version), we need to do so in the hypervisor in the v1 case.
Suggested-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Alan Robinson <alan.robinson@ts.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 5cb57f4bddee1f11079e69bf43c193a8b104c476
master date: 2015-06-09 16:00:24 +0200
Tim Deegan [Mon, 13 Jul 2015 12:02:00 +0000 (14:02 +0200)]
passthrough/amd: avoid reading an uninitialized variable
update_intremap_entry_from_msi() doesn't write to its data pointer on
some error paths, so we copying that variable into the msg would count
as undefined behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
master commit: a8ccf2d9f6f291f8fc6003e3d8bc7275ac1cc69f
master date: 2015-04-24 12:04:57 +0200
Andrew Cooper [Mon, 13 Apr 2015 16:11:12 +0000 (16:11 +0000)]
tools/libxc: Fix build of 32bit toolstacks on CentOS 5.x following XSA-125
gcc 4.1 of CentOS 5.x era does not like the typecheck in min() between
uint64_t and unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Ian Jackson [Mon, 9 Feb 2015 15:20:32 +0000 (15:20 +0000)]
libxl: event handling: ao_inprogress does waits while reports outstanding
libxl__ao_inprogress needs to check (like
libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports) that there are no
oustanding progress callbacks.
Otherwise it might happen that we would destroy the ao while another
thread has an outstanding callback its egc report queue. The other
thread would then, in its egc_run_callbacks, touch the destroyed ao.
Instead, when this happens in libxl__ao_inprogress, simply run round
the event loop again. The thread which eventually makes the callback
will spot our poller in the ao, and notify the poller, waking us up.
This fixes an assertion failure race seen with libvirt:
libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1792: libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports: Assertion `ao->in_initiator' failed.
or (after "Add an assert to egc_run_callbacks")
libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1338: egc_run_callbacks: Assertion `aop->ao->magic == 0xA0FACE00ul' failed.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit f1335f0d7b2402e94e0c6e8a905dc309edaafcfb)
Ian Jackson [Mon, 9 Feb 2015 15:18:30 +0000 (15:18 +0000)]
libxl: event handling: Break out ao_work_outstanding
Break out the test in libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports, into
ao_work_outstanding, which reports false if either (i) the ao is still
ongoing or (ii) there is a progress report (perhaps on a different
thread's callback queue) which has yet to be reported to the
application.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93699882d98cce9736d6e871db303275df1138a2)
Andrew Cooper [Mon, 13 Apr 2015 16:07:03 +0000 (16:07 +0000)]
tools/libxc: Fix build of 32bit toolstacks on CentOS 5.x following XSA-125
gcc 4.1 of CentOS 5.x era does not like the typecheck in min() between
uint64_t and unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 12e817e281034f5881f46e0e4f1d127820101a78)
Andrew Cooper [Mon, 2 Mar 2015 15:04:37 +0000 (15:04 +0000)]
tools/xenconsoled: Increase file descriptor limit
XenServer's VM density testing uncovered a regression when moving from
sysvinit to systemd where the file descriptor limit dropped from 4096 to
1024. (XenServer had previously inserted a ulimit statement into its
initscripts.)
One solution is to use LimitNOFILE=4096 in xenconsoled.service to match the
lost ulimit, but that is only a stopgap solution.
As Xenconsoled genuinely needs a large number of file descriptors if a large
number of domains are running, attempt to increase the limit.
Andrew Cooper [Fri, 30 Jan 2015 14:11:14 +0000 (14:11 +0000)]
ocaml/xenctrl: Fix stub_xc_readconsolering()
The Ocaml stub to retrieve the hypervisor console ring had a few problems.
* A single 32k buffer would truncate a large console ring.
* The buffer was static and not under the protection of the Ocaml GC lock so
could be clobbered by concurrent accesses.
* Embedded NUL characters would cause caml_copy_string() (which is strlen()
based) to truncate the buffer.
The function is rewritten from scratch, using the same algorithm as the python
stubs, but uses the protection of the Ocaml GC lock to maintain a static
running total of the ring size, to avoid redundant realloc()ing in future
calls.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Dave Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1a010ca99e9b04c1cfbd0ee718aa22d5ebd530ab)
(cherry picked from commit cfc4c43be14e60608ed0b8173365c737950afe41)
Andrew Cooper [Wed, 28 Jan 2015 17:55:32 +0000 (17:55 +0000)]
ocaml/xenctrl: Make failwith_xc() thread safe
The static error_str[] buffer is not thread-safe, and 1024 bytes is
unreasonably large. Reduce to 256 bytes (which is still much larger than any
current use), and move it to being a stack variable.
Also, propagate the Noreturn attribute from caml_raise_with_string().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Dave Scott <Dave.Scott@eu.citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit c8945d51613450c19e0898b1b3056c90f4929179)
(cherry picked from commit 032673c8836e28d9e291e0d02235001c41aedaab)
Andrew Cooper [Tue, 27 Jan 2015 20:38:11 +0000 (20:38 +0000)]
ocaml/xenctrl: Check return values from hypercalls
rather than blindly continuing and possibly using negative values.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> CC: Dave Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3380f5b6270e6fa4b24313f8808e7625e4c5a6ba)
(cherry picked from commit c91ed889ea3c3781a94a30909f30c3aad56c97d5)
Ian Jackson [Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:30:57 +0000 (09:30 -0600)]
libxl: In domain death search, start search at first domid we want
From: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
When domain_death_xswatch_callback needed a further call to
xc_domain_getinfolist it would restart it with the last domain it
found rather than the first one it wants.
If it only wants one it will also only ask for one domain. The result
would then be that it gets the previous domain again (ie, the previous
one to the one it wants), which still doesn't reveal the answer to the
question, and it would therefore loop again.
It's completely unclear to me why I thought it was a good idea to
start the xc_domain_getinfolist with the last domain previously found
rather than the first one left un-confirmed. The code has been that
way since it was introduced.
Instead, start each xc_domain_getinfolist at the next domain whose
status we need to check.
We also need to move the test for !evg into the loop, we now need evg
to compute the arguments to getinfolist.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4783c99aab866f470bd59368cfbf5ad5f677b0ec)
(cherry picked from commit 0b19348f3cd176e4badb173dd0054c49346a6ce1)
The fix is, when tearing down a pCPU, call the free_pdata()
hook from the scheduler of the cpupool the pCPU belongs to,
not always the one from the default scheduler.
projects / xen.git / log