Andrew Cooper [Tue, 7 Jan 2014 13:57:15 +0000 (14:57 +0100)]
AMD/iommu_detect: don't leak iommu structure on error paths
Tweak the logic slightly to return the real errors from
get_iommu_{,msi_}capabilities(), which at the moment is no functional change.
Coverity-ID: 1146950 Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tsahee Zidenberg [Sun, 22 Dec 2013 10:59:57 +0000 (12:59 +0200)]
ns16550: support ns16550a
Ns16550a devices are Ns16550 devices with additional capabilities.
Decare XEN is compatible with this device, to be able to use unmodified
devicetrees.
Ian Jackson [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 18:35:18 +0000 (18:35 +0000)]
libxc: Document xenctrl.h event channel calls
Provide semantic documentation for how the libxc calls relate to the
hypervisor interface, and how they are to be used.
Also document the bug (present at least in Linux 3.12) that setting
the evtchn fd to nonblocking doesn't in fact make xc_evtchn_pending
nonblocking, and describe the appropriate workaround.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Document the event channel protocol in xenstore-paths.markdown, in the
section for ~/device/suspend/event-channel.
Protocol reverse-engineered from commentary and commit messages of 4539594d46f9 Add facility to get notification of domain suspend ... 17636f47a474 Teach xc_save to use event-channel-based ...
and implementations in
xc_save (current version)
libxl (current version)
linux-2.6.18-xen (mercurial 1241:2993033a77ca)
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Ian Jackson [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 18:35:16 +0000 (18:35 +0000)]
xen: Document that EVTCHNOP_bind_interdomain signals
EVTCHNOP_bind_interdomain signals the event channel. Document this.
Also explain the usual use pattern.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Ian Jackson [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 18:35:15 +0000 (18:35 +0000)]
xen: Document XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe
Arguably this domctl is misnamed. But, for now, document its actual
behaviour (reverse-engineered from the code and found in the commit
message for 4539594d46f9) under its actual name.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> CC: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Julien Grall [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 14:28:19 +0000 (14:28 +0000)]
xen/arm: Allow ballooning working with 1:1 memory mapping
With the lack of iommu, dom0 must have a 1:1 memory mapping for all
these guest physical address. When the balloon decides to give back a
page to the kernel, this page must have the same address as previously.
Otherwise, we will loose the 1:1 mapping and will break DMA-capable
devices.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Yang Zhang [Tue, 7 Jan 2014 13:30:47 +0000 (14:30 +0100)]
VMX: Eliminate cr3 save/loading exiting when UG enabled
With the feature of unrestricted guest, there should be no vmexit
be triggered when guest accesses the cr3 in non-paging mode. This
patch will clear the cr3 save/loading bit in vmcs control filed to
eliminate cr3 access vmexit on UG avaliable hardware.
Jan Beulich [Tue, 7 Jan 2014 13:21:48 +0000 (14:21 +0100)]
IOMMU: make page table population preemptible
Since this can take an arbitrary amount of time, the rooting domctl as
well as all involved code must become aware of this requiring a
continuation.
The subject domain's rel_mem_list is being (ab)used for this, in a way
similar to and compatible with broken page offlining.
Further, operations get slightly re-ordered in assign_device(): IOMMU
page tables now get set up _before_ the first device gets assigned, at
once closing a small timing window in which the guest may already see
the device but wouldn't be able to access it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Just like for all other hypercalls we shouldn't be modifying the input
structure - all of the fields are, even if not explicitly documented,
just inputs (the one OUT one really refers to the memory pointed to by
that handle rather than the handle itself).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Jan Beulich [Fri, 20 Dec 2013 11:01:09 +0000 (12:01 +0100)]
fix XENMEM_add_to_physmap preemption handling
Just like for all other hypercalls we shouldn't be modifying the input
structure - all of the fields are, even if not explicitly documented,
just inputs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Matthew Daley [Sat, 30 Nov 2013 00:20:04 +0000 (13:20 +1300)]
xenstore: sanity check incoming message body lengths
This is for the client-side receiving messages from xenstored, so there
is no security impact, unlike XSA-72.
Coverity-ID: 1055449
Coverity-ID: 1056028 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Julien Grall [Wed, 18 Dec 2013 16:54:08 +0000 (16:54 +0000)]
xen/arm: p2m: Fix hypercall preemption when domain is relinquish memory mapping
The commit 84f29a9 "xen/arm: Add relinquish_p2m_mapping to remove reference on
every mapped page" doesn't save correctly the next gfn when the hypercall
is preempted.
Instead of storing the next gfn, it store the next mfn. Fix it by using
'addr' instead of 'maddr'.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Julien Grall [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 16:27:57 +0000 (16:27 +0000)]
xen/arm: Set foreign page type to p2m_map_foreign
Xen needs to know that the current page belongs to another domain. Also take
a reference to this page.
The current process to add a foreign page is:
1) get the page from the foreign p2m
2) take a reference on the page with the foreign domain in parameters
3) add the page to the current domain p2m
If the foreign domain drops the page:
- before 2), get_page will return NULL because the page doesn't
belong anymore to the domain
- after 2), the current domain already have a reference. Write will
occur to an old page which is not yet released. It can corrupt the foreign
domain.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Julien Grall [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 16:27:52 +0000 (16:27 +0000)]
xen/arm: Store p2m type in each page of the guest
Use the field 'avail' to store the type of the page. Rename it to 'type' for
convenience.
The information stored in this field will be retrieved in a future patch to
change the behaviour when the page is removed.
Also introduce guest_physmap_add_entry to map and set a specific p2m type for
a page.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Julien Grall [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 16:27:51 +0000 (16:27 +0000)]
xen/arm: Implement p2m_type_t as an enum
Until now, Xen doesn't know the type of the page (ram, foreign page, mmio,...).
Introduce p2m_type_t with basic types:
- p2m_invalid: Nothing is mapped here
- p2m_ram_rw: Normal read/write guest RAM
- p2m_ram_ro: Read-only guest RAM
- p2m_mmio_direct: Read/write mapping of device memory
- p2m_map_foreign: RAM page from foreign guest
- p2m_grant_map_rw: Read/write grant mapping
- p2m_grant_map_ro: Read-only grant mapping
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Julien Grall [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 16:27:50 +0000 (16:27 +0000)]
xen/arm: move mfn_to_p2m_entry in arch/arm/p2m.c
The function mfn_to_p2m_entry will be extended in a following patch to handle
p2m_type_t. It will break compilation because p2m_type_t is not defined
(interdependence between includes).
It's easier to move the function in arch/arm/p2m.c and it's not harmful as the
function is only used in this file.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Campbell [Wed, 18 Dec 2013 13:39:14 +0000 (13:39 +0000)]
xen: arm: process XENMEM_add_to_physmap_range forwards not backwards.
Jan points out that processing the list backwards is rather counter intuitive
and that the effect of the hypercall can differ between forwards and backwards
processing (e.g. in the presence of duplicate idx or gpfn, which would be
unusual but as Jan says, users are a creative bunch)
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Ian Campbell [Wed, 18 Dec 2013 11:54:46 +0000 (11:54 +0000)]
xen: arm: clarify cacheability requirements of hypercall arguments.
Accepting hypercall arguments which are either consistently in cached or
uncached is tricky and/or potentially slow, requiring a guest mapping lookup
to determine whether/when to do a cache clean or invalidate.
There are very few reasons, and no current use cases in practice, for a guest
to use uncached memory for their hypercall arguments. Therefore mandate that
all hypercall arguments must be mapped inner-cacheable.
Do not place any restriction on the outer-cacheability or on the cache
fill/flush strategy used.
If use cases arise then we can consider specific exemptions to this rule.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Ian Jackson [Tue, 26 Nov 2013 12:08:09 +0000 (12:08 +0000)]
libxl: Fix error handling in libxl__device_nic_from_xs_be
Previously, this function would leak the temporary return from xs_read for
handle and mac address. Fix both of these and the rest of the error handling.
This requires changing its return type and fixing the callers.
Introduce here a READ_BACKEND macro to make the code less repetitive.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- spell out what the leaks were in the commit message ]
Andrew Cooper [Wed, 11 Dec 2013 15:47:42 +0000 (15:47 +0000)]
tools/libxc: Fix error checking for xc_get_{cpu, node}map_size() callers
c/s 2e82c18cd850592ae9a1f682eb93965a868b5f2f changed the error returns of
xc_get_{cpu,node}map_size() to now include returning -1. This invalidated the
error checks from callers, which expected 0 to be the only error case.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Release-acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich [Tue, 17 Dec 2013 15:39:39 +0000 (16:39 +0100)]
x86/memshr: fix preemption in relinquish_shared_pages()
For one, should hypercall_preempt_check() return false the first time
it gets called, it would never have got called again (because count,
being checked for equality, didn't get reset to zero).
And then, if there were a huge range of unshared pages, with count not
getting incremented at all in that case there would also not be any
preemption.
Fix this by using a biased increment (ratio 1:16 for unshared vs shared
pages), and flushing the count to zero in case of a "false" return from
hypercall_preempt_check().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
If {copy_to,clear}_guest_offset() fails, we would leak the domain mappings for
l4 thru l1.
Fixing this requires having conditional unmaps on the faulting path, which in
turn requires explicitly initialising the pointers to NULL because of the
early ENOMEM exit.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Joe Jin [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 09:04:47 +0000 (17:04 +0800)]
Xend: handle died domain in getVCPUInfo()
When created new guest on NUMA server, xend tried to get the best node
by calculated all vcpus info, if domain already be terminated then
getVCPUInfo() will throw below exception and guest start failed:
[2013-09-04 20:01:26 6254] ERROR (XendDomainInfo:496) VM start failed
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py", line 482, in start
XendTask.log_progress(31, 60, self._initDomain)
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendTask.py", line 209, in log_progress
retval = func(*args, **kwds)
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py", line 2918, in _initDomain
node = self._setCPUAffinity()
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py", line 2835, in _setCPUAffinity
best_node = find_relaxed_node(candidate_node_list)[0]
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py", line 2803, in find_relaxed_node
cpuinfo = dom.getVCPUInfo()
File "/usr/lib64/python2.4/site-packages/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py", line 1600, in getVCPUInfo
raise XendError(str(exn))
XendError: (3, 'No such process')
This patch will check return value of xc.vcpu_getinfo() and make sure the
error not caused by domain died before throw the exception.
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Introduce a status field in struct pending_irq. Valid states are
GUEST_PENDING, GUEST_VISIBLE and GUEST_ENABLED and they are not mutually
exclusive. See the in-code comment for an explanation of the states and
how they are used.
Use atomic operations to set and clear the status bits. Note that
setting GIC_IRQ_GUEST_VISIBLE and clearing GIC_IRQ_GUEST_PENDING can be
done in two separate operations as the underlying pending status is
actually only cleared on the LR after the guest ACKs the interrupts.
Until that happens it's not possible to receive another interrupt.
The main effect of this patch is that an IRQ can be set to GUEST_PENDING
while it is being serviced by the guest. In maintenance_interrupt we
check whether GUEST_PENDING is set and if it is we add the irq back into
the lr_pending queue so that it's going to be reinjected one more time,
if the interrupt is still enabled at the vgicd level.
If it is not, it is going to be injected as soon as the guest renables
the interrupt.
One exception is evtchn_irq: in that case we don't want to
set the GIC_IRQ_GUEST_PENDING bit if it is already GUEST_VISIBLE,
because as part of the event handling loop, the guest would realize that
new events are present even without a new notification.
Also we already have a way to figure out exactly when we do need to
inject a second notification if vgic_vcpu_inject_irq is called after the
end of the guest event handling loop and before the guest EOIs the
interrupt (see db453468d92369e7182663fb13e14d83ec4ce456 "arm: vgic: fix
race between evtchn upcall and evtchnop_send").
Don't call gic_inject_irq_stop from maintenance_interrupt because
gic_inject (called by leave_hypervisor_tail) is going to call
gic_inject_irq_start/stop appropriately later anyway.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Campbell [Fri, 13 Dec 2013 08:21:51 +0000 (08:21 +0000)]
tools: libxc: flush data cache after loading images into guest memory
On ARM guest OSes are started with MMU and Caches disables (as they are on
native) however caching is enabled in the domain running the builder and
therefore we must flush the cache as we load the blobs, otherwise when the
guest starts running it may not see them. The dom0 build in the hypervisor has
the same requirements and already does the right thing.
The mechanism for performing a cache flush from userspace is OS specific, so
implement this as a new osdep hook:
- On 32-bit ARM Linux provides a system call to flush the cache.
- On 64-bit ARM Linux the processor is configured to allow cache flushes
directly from userspace.
- Non-Linux platforms will need to provide their own implementation. If
similar mechanisms are not available then a new privcmd ioctl should be a
suitable alternative.
No cache maintenance is required on x86, so provide a stub for all non-Linux
platforms which returns success on x86 only and log an error otherwise.
This fixes guest building on Xgene which has a very large L3 cache and so is
particularly susceptible to this problem. It has also been observed
sporadically on midway.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@calxeda.com> Cc: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar <psawargaonkar@apm.com> Cc: Anup Patel <apatel@apm.com>
Matthew Daley [Sat, 14 Dec 2013 01:04:47 +0000 (14:04 +1300)]
xenconsole: adjust pty opening error checking and handling
Currently we check the pty path received from xenstore with access(); if
it indicates that the pty is not accessible, we loop around and wait for
a new path to appear in xenstore.
This has several issues:
* If a path has been written to xenstore, it can be assumed that that
pty should already be accessible to xenconsole, and hence any error
that occurs while trying to open it should be fatal and not ignored
* If access() indicates no access to the pty, the memory allocated for
the path is leaked when going around the loop again
* The accessibility of the pty could change between the access() and
open() calls, leading to a TOCTOU race (this is what Coverity is
complaining about).
By removing the explicit access() check and just erroring out whenever
open() fails, we fix all these issues.
Coverity-ID: 1056047 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
David Vrabel [Mon, 16 Dec 2013 09:51:24 +0000 (10:51 +0100)]
evtchn/fifo: map correct pages when guest is HVM
If a HVM guest attempts to use the FIFO-based ABI it will not receive
any events and destroying the guest may crash Xen or trigger an assert
when attempting to unmap a control block page. This occurs because
Xen maps the wrong page for both the control blocks and the event
arrays.
In map_guest_page(), use the MFN of the guest's page and not the GFN
when calling map_domain_page_global().
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cache the xs_daemon_socket{,_ro}() strings to save pointlessly
re-snprintf()'ing the same path, and add explicit size checks against
addr.sun_path before strcpy()'ing into it.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Matthew Daley [Tue, 3 Dec 2013 01:29:04 +0000 (14:29 +1300)]
libxl: don't leak ptr in libxl_list_vm error case
While at it, tidy up the function; there's no point in allocating more
than the amount of domains actually returned by xc_domain_getinfolist
(barring the caveat described in the newly-added comment)
Coverity-ID: 1055888 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Matthew Daley [Mon, 2 Dec 2013 12:45:16 +0000 (01:45 +1300)]
xenstore: check F_SETFL fcntl invocation in setnonblock
...and check the newly-added result of setnonblock itself where used.
Coverity-ID: 1055103 Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich [Fri, 13 Dec 2013 14:06:11 +0000 (15:06 +0100)]
x86/p2m: restrict auditing to debug builds
... since iterating through all of a guest's pages may take unduly
long.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Release-acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Rob Hoes [Thu, 12 Dec 2013 16:36:49 +0000 (16:36 +0000)]
ocaml: do not install test binaries
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added back an Empty install rule ]
Rob Hoes [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 16:48:32 +0000 (16:48 +0000)]
libxl: ocaml: drop the ocaml heap lock before calling into libxl
Ocaml has a heap lock which must be held whenever ocaml code is running. Ocaml
usually drops this lock when it enters a potentially blocking low-level
function, such as writing to a file. Libxl has its own lock, which it may
acquire when being called.
Things get interesting when libxl calls back into ocaml code. There is a risk
of ending up in a deadlock when a thread holds both locks at the same time,
then temporarily drop the ocaml lock, while another thread calls another libxl
function.
To avoid deadlocks, we drop the ocaml heap lock before entering libxl, and
reacquire it in callbacks to ocaml. This way, the ocaml heap lock is never held
together with the libxl lock, except in osevent registration callbacks, and
xentoollog callbacks. If we guarantee to not call any libxl functions inside
those callbacks, we can avoid deadlocks.
This patch handle the dropping and reacquiring of the ocaml heap lock by the
caml_enter_blocking_section and caml_leave_blocking_section functions, and
related macros. We are also careful to not call any functions that access the
ocaml heap while the ocaml heap lock is dropped. This often involves copying
ocaml values to C before dropping the ocaml lock.
The ao_how in aohow_val is now malloc'ed, just to make this function a little
easier to use.
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Rob Hoes [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 16:48:30 +0000 (16:48 +0000)]
libxl: ocaml: add VM lifecycle operations
Also:
* Reorganise toplevel OCaml functions into modules of Xenlight.
* Factor out the management of ao_how into the function aohow_val. The ao_how
is now malloc'ed, just to make this function a little easier to use.
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Rob Hoes [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 16:48:27 +0000 (16:48 +0000)]
libxl: ocaml: event management
Having bindings to the low-level functions libxl_osevent_register_hooks and
related, allows to run an event loop in OCaml; either one we write ourselves,
or one that is available elsewhere.
The Lwt cooperative threads library (http://ocsigen.org/lwt/), which is quite
popular these days, has an event loop that can be easily extended to poll any
additional fds that we get from libxl. Lwt provides a "lightweight" threading
model, which does not let you run any other (POSIX) threads in your
application, and therefore excludes an event loop implemented in the C
bindings.
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Rob Hoes [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 16:48:26 +0000 (16:48 +0000)]
libxl: ocaml: implement some simple tests
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Ian Campbell [Mon, 9 Dec 2013 14:58:24 +0000 (14:58 +0000)]
xen: arm: inject unhandled instruction and data aborts to the guest.
Currently an unhandled data abort in guest context leads to us killing the
guest and an unhandled instruction abort in guest context leads to us killing
the host!
Andre pointed out that an unhandled data abort can be caused by e.g. dmidecode
looking for things which are not there in the guests physical address space.
Propagating the fault to the guest allows it to properly SIGSEGV the
processes.
A guest kernel can trivially jump to an unmapped physical address which would
cause an instruction abort. Killing the host for that is obviously bad.
Instead inject the exception so the guest kernel can SIGSEGV or panic() etc as
it deems appropriate.
Tested on arm64 (Mustang) and arm32 (Midway) with a dom0 kernel late_initcall
which either dereferences or jumps to address 0, provoking both behaviours and
resulting correctly in a guest kernel panic. Also tested on fast models with a
32-bit dom0 on a 64-bit hypervisor, which behaved correctly.
In addition tested on both platforms with a userspace program which either
calls to or dereferences address 0. The process is correctly killed with SEGV.
Lastly tested on Mustang with a 32-bit version of the userspace test on a
64-bit dom0 kernel.
I think that covers all the cases.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@calxeda.com>
[ ijc -- fixed up whitespace in if statements in cpsr_mode_switch ]
Jan Beulich [Wed, 11 Dec 2013 09:33:19 +0000 (10:33 +0100)]
x86/PV: don't commit debug register values early in arch_set_info_guest()
They're being taken care of later (via set_debugreg()), and temporarily
copying them into struct vcpu means that bad values may end up getting
loaded during context switch if the vCPU is already running and the
function errors out between the premature and real commit step, leading
to the same issue that XSA-12 dealt with.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Release-acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Jan Beulich [Wed, 11 Dec 2013 09:30:02 +0000 (10:30 +0100)]
x86/cpuidle: publish new states only after fully initializing them
Since state information coming from Dom0 can arrive at any time, on
any CPU, we ought to make sure that a new state is fully initialized
before the target CPU might be using it.
Once touching that code, also do minor cleanup: A missing (but benign)
"break" and some white space adjustments.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Jan Beulich [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 15:10:37 +0000 (16:10 +0100)]
IOMMU: clear "don't flush" override on error paths
Both xenmem_add_to_physmap() and iommu_populate_page_table() each have
an error path that fails to clear that flag, thus suppressing further
flushes on the respective pCPU.
In iommu_populate_page_table() also slightly re-arrange code to avoid
the false impression of the flag in question being guarded by a
domain's page_alloc_lock.
This is CVE-2013-6400 / XSA-80.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Campbell [Tue, 10 Dec 2013 15:09:24 +0000 (16:09 +0100)]
xen: list interfaces subject to the security process exception in XSA-77
List all the sub ops of:
__HYPERVISOR_domctl
__HYPERVISOR_sysctl
__HYPERVISOR_memory_op
__HYPERVISOR_tmem_op
which are subject to the policy given in
http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-77.html
It is expected that these lists will be whittled away as each interface is
audited for safety.
New interfaces should be expected to be safe when introduced (IOW the list
should never be expanded).
This is XSA-77.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The commit d963923 "xen: arm: correct return value of
raw_copy_{to/from}_guest_*, raw_clear_guest" doesn't permit to boot guest
on Xen ARM.
Remove the stray semicolon from the end of the if statement.
Also we want to get the right rc in the error arrays, so we need to do the
copy_to_guest_offset before checking the rc returned by
xenmem_add_to_physmap_one.
Ian Campbell [Mon, 9 Dec 2013 11:43:35 +0000 (11:43 +0000)]
xen: arm: handle initrd addresses above the 4G boundary
The Xgene platform has no RAM below 4G.
The /chosen/linux,initrd-* properties do not have "reg" semantics and
therefore #*-size are not used when interpreting. Instead they are are simply
numbers which are interpreted according to the properties length.
Fix this both when parsing the entry in the host DTB and when creating the
dom0 DTB. For dom0 we simply hardcode a 64-bit size, this is acceptable
even for a 32-bit guest.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Ian Campbell [Mon, 9 Dec 2013 11:09:10 +0000 (11:09 +0000)]
xen: arm: do not BUG on guest paddrs which are very high
The BUG_ON in p2m_map_first was over aggressive since the paddr_t can have
come from the guest, via add_to_physmap. Instead return failure to the caller.
Also the check was simultaneously too lose. The valid offsets are
0..P2M_FIRST_ENTRIES-1 inclusive.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Wei Liu [Sun, 8 Dec 2013 20:50:20 +0000 (20:50 +0000)]
Config.mk: update OVMF changeset
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Tests various vcpu-pinning strings. If run without arguments acts
as follows:
- generates some test data and saves them in
check-xl-vcpupin-parse.data;
- tests all the generated configurations (reading them back from
check-xl-vcpupin-parse.data).
An example of a test vector file is provided in
check-xl-vcpupin-parse.data-example.
Options:
-h prints this message
-r seed uses seed for initializing the rundom number generator
(default: the script PID)
-s string tries using string as a vcpu pinning configuration and
reports whether that succeeds or not
-o ofile save the test data in ofile
(default: check-xl-vcpupin-parse.data)
-i ifile read test data from ifile
An example test data file (generated on a 2 NUMA nodes, 16 CPUs
host) is being provided in check-xl-vcpupin-parse.data-example.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Dario Faggioli [Sat, 7 Dec 2013 00:05:26 +0000 (01:05 +0100)]
xl: implement and enable dryrun mode for `xl vcpu-pin'
As it can be useful to see if the outcome of some complex vCPU
pinning bitmap specification looks as expected.
This also allow for the introduction of some automatic testing
and verification for the bitmap parsing code, as it happens
already in check-xl-disk-parse and check-xl-vif-parse.
In particular, to make the above possible, this commit also
changes the implementation of the vcpu-pin command so that,
instead of always returning 0, it returns an error if the
parsing fails.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Dario Faggioli [Sat, 7 Dec 2013 00:05:18 +0000 (01:05 +0100)]
xl: allow for node-wise specification of vcpu pinning
Making it possible to use something like the following:
* "nodes:0-3": all pCPUs of nodes 0,1,2,3;
* "nodes:0-3,^node:2": all pCPUS of nodes 0,1,3;
* "1,nodes:1-2,^6": pCPU 1 plus all pCPUs of nodes 1,2
but not pCPU 6;
* ...
In both domain config file and `xl vcpu-pin'.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Dario Faggioli [Sat, 7 Dec 2013 00:05:03 +0000 (01:05 +0100)]
libxc/libxl: sanitize error handling in *_get_max_{cpus, nodes}
In libxc, make xc_get_max_{cpus,node}() always return either a
positive number or -1, and change all the callers to deal with
that.
In libxl, make libxl_get_max_{cpus,nodes}() always return either a
positive number or a libxl error code. Thanks to that, it is also
possible to fix loggig for libxl_{cpu,node}_bitmap_alloc(), which
now happens inside the functions themselves, more accurately
reporting what happened.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Dario Faggioli [Sat, 7 Dec 2013 00:04:55 +0000 (01:04 +0100)]
libxl: move libxl_{cpu, node}_bitmap_alloc()
in libxl_utils.c (from .h), as they will be reworked in
the next commit ("libxc/libxl: sanitize error handling in
*_get_max_{cpus,nodes}") and we want to keep code motion
separate from functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
projects / xen.git / log