From: Michael S. Tsirkin Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 16:51:14 +0000 (+0300) Subject: virtio: out-of-bounds buffer write on invalid state load X-Git-Tag: qemu-xen-4.4.3-rc1~46 X-Git-Url: http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?a=commitdiff_plain;h=dee7babbcc9277a63c1aa0cfd6424e6464a30b3a;p=qemu-upstream-4.4-testing.git virtio: out-of-bounds buffer write on invalid state load CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c So we have this code since way back when: num = qemu_get_be32(f); for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f); array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela --- diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c index 2f1e73bc7..178026294 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c @@ -888,7 +888,8 @@ int virtio_set_features(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t val) int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f) { - int num, i, ret; + int i, ret; + uint32_t num; uint32_t features; uint32_t supported_features; BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev)); @@ -916,6 +917,11 @@ int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f) num = qemu_get_be32(f); + if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) { + error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num); + return -1; + } + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f); if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {