From: Ian Jackson Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2009 15:42:15 +0000 (+0100) Subject: passthrough: fix security issue with stubdoms X-Git-Tag: xen-4.0.0-rc1~15 X-Git-Url: http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b4bb8b3f09d1c873f522f6aebe1f125a6d1854d0;p=qemu-xen-4.1-testing.git passthrough: fix security issue with stubdoms this patch series fixes the outstanding security problem with stubdoms and pci passthrough. The idea is to allow mmio, irq and ioport remapping not only if the current domain IS_PRIV_FOR but also if the current domain has permissions over those mmio areas, irqs and ioports. This way a stubdom can only remap resources that currently "owns". This patch series also moves the de\assign_device hypercalls from the list of hypercalls made by qemu\stubdom to xend. The two patches must be applied at the same time otherwise pci passthrough won't work for HVM guests. [PATCH 2 of 2] qemu: do not call xc_assign_device This patch removes the call to xc_assign_device from qemu. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini --- diff --git a/hw/pass-through.c b/hw/pass-through.c index a207b2c5f..cdf0f31bc 100644 --- a/hw/pass-through.c +++ b/hw/pass-through.c @@ -4168,7 +4168,6 @@ static struct pt_dev * register_real_device(PCIBus *e_bus, struct pt_dev *assigned_device = NULL; struct pci_dev *pci_dev; uint8_t e_device, e_intx; - struct pci_config_cf8 machine_bdf; char *key, *val; int msi_translate, power_mgmt; @@ -4253,15 +4252,6 @@ static struct pt_dev * register_real_device(PCIBus *e_bus, assigned_device->is_virtfn = pt_dev_is_virtfn(pci_dev); pt_iomul_init(assigned_device, r_bus, r_dev, r_func); - /* Assign device */ - machine_bdf.reg = 0; - machine_bdf.bus = r_bus; - machine_bdf.dev = r_dev; - machine_bdf.func = r_func; - rc = xc_assign_device(xc_handle, domid, machine_bdf.value); - if ( rc < 0 ) - PT_LOG("Error: xc_assign_device error %d\n", rc); - /* Initialize virtualized PCI configuration (Extended 256 Bytes) */ for ( i = 0; i < PCI_CONFIG_SIZE; i++ ) assigned_device->dev.config[i] = pci_read_byte(pci_dev, i);