From: Jan Beulich Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:10:42 +0000 (+0100) Subject: x86: constrain MFN range Dom0 may access X-Git-Url: http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?a=commitdiff_plain;h=53de839fb40936c074213a0c400e3c959e4ec461;p=people%2Fliuw%2Flibxenctrl-split%2Fxen.git x86: constrain MFN range Dom0 may access ... to that covered by the physical address width supported by the processor. This implicitly avoids Dom0 (accidentally or due to some kind of abuse) passing out of range addresses to a guest, which in turn eliminates this only possibility for PV guests to create PTEs with one or more reserved bits set. Note that this is not a security issue due to XSA-77. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper --- diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c index d02dc4bfbf..cb287f0698 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c @@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0( /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */ rc |= ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF); - rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, ~0UL); + rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1); rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1); /* diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c index fcf6577dbb..83f82b87be 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -4604,7 +4604,7 @@ struct memory_map_context static int _handle_iomem_range(unsigned long s, unsigned long e, struct memory_map_context *ctxt) { - if ( s > ctxt->s ) + if ( s > ctxt->s && !(s >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ) { e820entry_t ent; XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(e820entry_t) buffer_param;