From: Eric Auger Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2023 16:21:26 +0000 (+0200) Subject: hw/virtio-iommu: Fix potential OOB access in virtio_iommu_handle_command() X-Git-Tag: qemu-xen-4.18.0-rc5~21 X-Git-Url: http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?a=commitdiff_plain;h=18963f458f71da2535e1c367ea66165d0cd9fd33;p=qemu-xen.git hw/virtio-iommu: Fix potential OOB access in virtio_iommu_handle_command() In the virtio_iommu_handle_command() when a PROBE request is handled, output_size takes a value greater than the tail size and on a subsequent iteration we can get a stack out-of-band access. Initialize the output_size on each iteration. The issue was found with ASAN. Credits to: Yiming Tao(Zhejiang University) Gaoning Pan(Zhejiang University) Fixes: 1733eebb9e7 ("virtio-iommu: Implement RESV_MEM probe request") Signed-off-by: Eric Auger Reported-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Message-Id: <20230717162126.11693-1-eric.auger@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin (cherry picked from commit cf2f89edf36a59183166ae8721a8d7ab5cd286bd) Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev --- diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.c index 1cd258135d..e84300d50c 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.c +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.c @@ -727,13 +727,15 @@ static void virtio_iommu_handle_command(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) VirtIOIOMMU *s = VIRTIO_IOMMU(vdev); struct virtio_iommu_req_head head; struct virtio_iommu_req_tail tail = {}; - size_t output_size = sizeof(tail), sz; VirtQueueElement *elem; unsigned int iov_cnt; struct iovec *iov; void *buf = NULL; + size_t sz; for (;;) { + size_t output_size = sizeof(tail); + elem = virtqueue_pop(vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement)); if (!elem) { return;