xen/arm: traps: Avoid BUG_ON() in do_trap_brk()

At the moment, do_trap_brk() is using a BUG_ON() to check the hardware
has been correctly configured during boot.

Any error when configuring the hardware could result to a guest 'brk'
trapping in the hypervisor and crash it.

This is pretty harsh to kill Xen when actually killing the guest would
be enough as misconfiguring this trap would not lead to exposing
sensitive data. Replace the BUG_ON() with crashing the guest.

Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
index 132686ee0f641444d01971061913976c5fcfbf5e..ef37ca6bde25907c03fbbca957da729dab7bdccc 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
@@ -1304,10 +1304,15 @@ int do_bug_frame(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, vaddr_t pc)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_64
 static void do_trap_brk(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, const union hsr hsr)
 {
-    /* HCR_EL2.TGE and MDCR_EL2.TDE are not set so we never receive
-     * software breakpoint exception for EL1 and EL0 here.
+    /*
+     * HCR_EL2.TGE and MDCR_EL2.TDR are currently not set. So we should
+     * never receive software breakpoing exception for EL1 and EL0 here.
      */
-    BUG_ON(!hyp_mode(regs));
+    if ( !hyp_mode(regs) )
+    {
+        domain_crash(current->domain);
+        return;
+    }
 
     switch ( hsr.brk.comment )
     {