Add secure_modules() call

Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
only modules signed with a trusted key.

Bugzilla: N/A
Upstream-status: Fedora mustard.  Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 3a19c79918e02d37c3e77ed32a88eb9f36bb16c3..db386349cd01441711454dffb12a3151692f25b1 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -635,6 +635,8 @@ static inline bool module_requested_async_probing(struct module *module)
        return module && module->async_probe_requested;
 }
 
+extern bool secure_modules(void);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
 
 /* Given an address, look for it in the exception tables. */
@@ -751,6 +753,10 @@ static inline bool module_requested_async_probing(struct module *module)
        return false;
 }
 
+static inline bool secure_modules(void)
+{
+       return false;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index b86b7bf1be388d72fe92fb6038b4a67b4710df1f..7f045246e1231e7eafcf5b19c898d0f67b51a664 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -4087,3 +4087,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
 #endif
+
+bool secure_modules(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+       return (sig_enforce || modules_disabled);
+#else
+       return modules_disabled;
+#endif
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules);