enough. Setting this to a high value may cause boot failure, particularly if
the NMI watchdog is also enabled.
+### cet
+ = List of [ shstk=<bool> ]
+
+ Applicability: x86
+
+Controls for the use of Control-flow Enforcement Technology. CET is group a
+of hardware features designed to combat Return-oriented Programming (ROP, also
+call/jmp COP/JOP) attacks.
+
+* The `shstk=` boolean controls whether Xen uses Shadow Stacks for its own
+ protection.
+
+ The option is available when `CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK` is compiled in, and
+ defaults to `true` on hardware supporting CET-SS. Specifying
+ `cet=no-shstk` will cause Xen not to use Shadow Stacks even when support
+ is available in hardware.
+
### clocksource (x86)
> `= pit | hpet | acpi | tsc`
config INDIRECT_THUNK
def_bool $(cc-option,-mindirect-branch-register)
+config HAS_AS_CET_SS
+ # binutils >= 2.29 or LLVM >= 6
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrssq %rax$(comma)0;setssbsy)
+
menu "Architecture Features"
source "arch/Kconfig"
If unsure, say Y.
+config XEN_SHSTK
+ bool "Supervisor Shadow Stacks"
+ depends on HAS_AS_CET_SS && EXPERT
+ default y
+ ---help---
+ Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is a set of features in
+ hardware designed to combat Return-oriented Programming (ROP, also
+ call/jump COP/JOP) attacks. Shadow Stacks are one CET feature
+ designed to provide return address protection.
+
+ This option arranges for Xen to use CET-SS for its own protection.
+ When CET-SS is active, 32bit PV guests cannot be used. Backwards
+ compatiblity can be provided vai the PV Shim mechanism.
+
config SHADOW_PAGING
bool "Shadow Paging"
default y
size_param("highmem-start", highmem_start);
#endif
+static bool __initdata opt_xen_shstk = true;
+
+static int __init parse_cet(const char *s)
+{
+ const char *ss;
+ int val, rc = 0;
+
+ do {
+ ss = strchr(s, ',');
+ if ( !ss )
+ ss = strchr(s, '\0');
+
+ if ( (val = parse_boolean("shstk", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
+ opt_xen_shstk = val;
+#else
+ no_config_param("XEN_SHSTK", "cet", s, ss);
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ s = ss + 1;
+ } while ( *ss );
+
+ return rc;
+}
+custom_param("cet", parse_cet);
+
cpumask_t __read_mostly cpu_present_map;
unsigned long __read_mostly xen_phys_start;
#define cpu_has_aperfmperf boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF)
#define cpu_has_lfence_dispatch boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH)
#define cpu_has_xen_lbr boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_LBR)
+#define cpu_has_xen_shstk boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK)
#define cpu_has_msr_tsc_aux (cpu_has_rdtscp || cpu_has_rdpid)
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_PV, X86_SYNTH(23)) /* VERW used by Xen for PV */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */
/* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */
#define X86_NR_BUG 1
# Return y if the linker supports <flag>, n otherwise
ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1))
+# $(as-instr,<instr>)
+# Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise
+as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)
+
# check if $(CC) and $(LD) exist
$(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(CC)),compiler '$(CC)' not found)
$(error-if,$(failure,command -v $(LD)),linker '$(LD)' not found)