]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commitdiff
tools/xenstore: add memory accounting for responses
authorJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tue, 13 Sep 2022 05:35:09 +0000 (07:35 +0200)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tue, 1 Nov 2022 15:20:41 +0000 (15:20 +0000)
Add the memory accounting for queued responses.

In case adding a watch event for a guest is causing the hard memory
quota of that guest to be violated, the event is dropped. This will
ensure that it is impossible to drive another guest past its memory
quota by generating insane amounts of events for that guest. This is
especially important for protecting driver domains from that attack
vector.

This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42315.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
(cherry picked from commit f6d00133643a524d2138c9e3f192bbde719050ba)

tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c

index 9fd83ea0259acfd7f43a58c0bb45f2c3685781ff..4322d3cf63a143f113e23acfa7635822bd3e0e03 100644 (file)
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
                }
        }
 
+       domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, -out->hdr.msg.len - sizeof(out->hdr));
+
        if (out->hdr.msg.type == XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
                req = out->pend.req;
                if (req) {
@@ -845,11 +847,14 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
        bdata->timeout_msec = 0;
        bdata->watch_event = false;
 
-       if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE)
+       if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) {
                bdata->buffer = bdata->default_buffer;
-       else {
+               /* Don't check quota, path might be used for returning error. */
+               domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr));
+       } else {
                bdata->buffer = talloc_array(bdata, char, len);
-               if (!bdata->buffer) {
+               if (!bdata->buffer ||
+                   domain_memory_add_chk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr))) {
                        send_error(conn, ENOMEM);
                        return;
                }
@@ -914,6 +919,11 @@ void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
                }
        }
 
+       if (domain_memory_add_chk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr))) {
+               talloc_free(bdata);
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (timeout_watch_event_msec && domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
                bdata->timeout_msec = get_now_msec() + timeout_watch_event_msec;
                if (!conn->timeout_msec)