]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - people/dariof/xen.git/commitdiff
asm-x86/monitor: Fix monitor capability reporting on SVM systems
authorAlexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Mon, 12 Feb 2018 15:08:15 +0000 (17:08 +0200)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Wed, 14 Feb 2018 18:01:28 +0000 (18:01 +0000)
No monitor features are available on AMD and all
capabilities are passed only to the Intel processor architecture.
This means that the arch_monitor_get_capabilities returns
capabilities = 0.

This patch is separating out features which are implemented on both
systems from those implemented only on Intel, so that we advertize the
working capabilities on AMD.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h

index a0444d105bf24855cf04c48f9a68ede379f2f745..9ef6dff87c3c2882aa1c928893a3cad090e44bfa 100644 (file)
@@ -71,24 +71,28 @@ static inline uint32_t arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d)
     uint32_t capabilities = 0;
 
     /*
-     * At the moment only Intel HVM domains are supported. However, event
-     * delivery could be extended to AMD and PV domains.
+     * At the moment only Intel and AMD HVM domains are supported. However,
+     * event delivery could be extended to PV domains.
      */
-    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cpu_has_vmx )
+    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
         return capabilities;
 
-    capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) |
-                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED);
-
-    /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
-    if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
-        capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
+    capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST);
+
+    if ( cpu_has_vmx )
+    {
+        capabilities |= ((1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) |
+                         (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED));
+
+        /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
+        if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
+            capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
+    }
 
     if ( hvm_funcs.set_descriptor_access_exiting )
         capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DESC_ACCESS);