]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commitdiff
x86/spec-ctrl: Rework ibpb_calculations()
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Thu, 27 Jul 2023 19:03:28 +0000 (20:03 +0100)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:02:54 +0000 (16:02 +0100)
... in order to make the SRSO mitigations easier to integrate.

 * Check for AMD/Hygon CPUs directly, rather than assuming based on IBPB.
   In particular, Xen supports synthesising the IBPB bit to guests on Intel to
   allow IBPB while dissuading the use of (legacy) IBRS.
 * Collect def_ibpb_entry rather than opencoding the BTC_NO calculation for
   both opt_ibpb_entry_{pv,hvm}.

No functional change.

This is part of XSA-434 / CVE-2023-20569

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 292f68fb77196a35ac92b296792770d0f3190d75)

xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c

index 75de2595929f2004b0be71d5f3282cb6ad08dcda..60d4a89ebd6319628f371d904977621f823973dc 100644 (file)
@@ -896,6 +896,8 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
 
 static void __init ibpb_calculations(void)
 {
+    bool def_ibpb_entry = false;
+
     /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */
     if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) )
     {
@@ -904,28 +906,28 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(void)
         return;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * AMD/Hygon CPUs to date (June 2022) don't flush the the RAS.  Future
-     * CPUs are expected to enumerate IBPB_RET when this has been fixed.
-     * Until then, cover the difference with the software sequence.
-     */
-    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET) )
-        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
+    {
+        /*
+         * AMD/Hygon CPUs to date (June 2022) don't flush the RAS.  Future
+         * CPUs are expected to enumerate IBPB_RET when this has been fixed.
+         * Until then, cover the difference with the software sequence.
+         */
+        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET) )
+            setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
+
+        /*
+         * AMD/Hygon CPUs up to and including Zen2 suffer from Branch Type
+         * Confusion.  Mitigate with IBPB-on-entry.
+         */
+        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO) )
+            def_ibpb_entry = true;
+    }
 
-    /*
-     * IBPB-on-entry mitigations for Branch Type Confusion.
-     *
-     * IBPB && !BTC_NO selects all AMD/Hygon hardware, not known to be safe,
-     * that we can provide some form of mitigation on.
-     */
     if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv == -1 )
-        opt_ibpb_entry_pv = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) &&
-                             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
-                             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO));
+        opt_ibpb_entry_pv = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) && def_ibpb_entry;
     if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm == -1 )
-        opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) &&
-                              boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
-                              !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO));
+        opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) && def_ibpb_entry;
 
     if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv )
     {