x86/spec-ctrl: Knobs for STIBP and PSFD, and follow hardware STIBP hint

STIBP and PSFD are slightly weird bits, because they're both implied by other
bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL.  Add fine grain controls for them, and take the
implications into account when setting IBRS/SSBD.

Rearrange the IBPB text/variables/logic to keep all the MSR_SPEC_CTRL bits
together, for consistency.

However, AMD have a hardware hint CPUID bit recommending that STIBP be set
unilaterally.  This is advertised on Zen3, so follow the recommendation.
Furthermore, in such cases, set STIBP behind the guest's back for now.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit fef244b179c06fcdfa581f7d57fa6e578c49ff50)
[Adjust for absence of INTEL_PSFD]

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index 022cb01da762607d0ff5492894768de5ee0ef88a..a998418585bda90a358d0b02e084b8142e3a7399 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -2034,8 +2034,9 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
 
 ### spec-ctrl (x86)
 > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>,
->              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu,
->              l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
+>              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
+>              eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
+>              unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
 
 Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations.  By default, Xen
 will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
@@ -2085,9 +2086,10 @@ On hardware supporting IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation), the
 If Xen is not using IBRS itself, functionality is still set up so IBRS can be
 virtualised for guests.
 
-On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=`
-option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch
-prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.
+On hardware supporting STIBP (Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors), the
+`stibp=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.
+By default, Xen will use STIBP when IBRS is in use (IBRS implies STIBP), and
+when hardware hints recommend using it as a blanket setting.
 
 On hardware supporting SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable), the `ssbd=`
 option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.  On AMD
@@ -2095,6 +2097,15 @@ hardware, this is a global option applied at boot, and not virtualised for
 guest use.  On Intel hardware, the feature is virtualised for guests,
 independently of Xen's choice of setting.
 
+On hardware supporting PSFD (Predictive Store Forwarding Disable), the `psfd=`
+option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.  By
+default, Xen will not use PSFD.  PSFD is implied by SSBD, and SSBD is off by
+default.
+
+On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=`
+option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch
+prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.
+
 On all hardware, the `eager-fpu=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen
 from using fully eager FPU context switches.  This is currently implemented as
 a global control.  By default, Xen will choose to use fully eager context

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index e037e9b52ea2a1d72849b33bf136392260aaad37..a4121e25cc63f1e15e031a4d3564ce4391f18cb1 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ static enum ind_thunk {
     THUNK_LFENCE,
     THUNK_JMP,
 } opt_thunk __initdata = THUNK_DEFAULT;
+
 static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1;
+int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1;
+bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd;
+int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1;
+
 bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true;
-bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd = false;
 int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
 int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
 bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true;
@@ -174,12 +178,20 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
             else
                 rc = -EINVAL;
         }
+
+        /* Bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibrs", s, ss)) >= 0 )
             opt_ibrs = val;
-        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-            opt_ibpb = val;
+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("stibp", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+            opt_stibp = val;
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
             opt_ssbd = val;
+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("psfd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+            opt_psfd = val;
+
+        /* Misc settings. */
+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+            opt_ibpb = val;
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 )
             opt_eager_fpu = val;
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 )
@@ -375,7 +387,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
                "\n");
 
     /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
-    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
            thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "N/A" :
            thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
            thunk == THUNK_LFENCE    ? "LFENCE" :
@@ -389,6 +401,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
            (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) &&
             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))     ? "" :
            (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)  ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
+           !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) &&
+           (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_PSFD)  ? " PSFD+" : " PSFD-",
            !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)              ? "" :
            (opt_tsx & 1)                             ? " TSX+" : " TSX-",
            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)     ? "" :
@@ -1034,14 +1048,48 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM);
     }
 
-    /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */
+    /* Figure out default_xen_spec_ctrl. */
     if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs )
+    {
+        /* IBRS implies STIBP.  */
+        if ( opt_stibp == -1 )
+            opt_stibp = 1;
+
         default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set.  Otherwise, leave it
+     * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware
+     * where it was retrofitted in microcode.
+     */
+    if ( opt_stibp == -1 )
+        opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS);
+
+    if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) )
+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 
-    /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */
     if ( opt_ssbd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) ||
                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) )
+    {
+        /* SSBD implies PSFD */
+        if ( opt_psfd == -1 )
+            opt_psfd = 1;
+
         default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Don't use PSFD by default.  AMD designed the predictor to
+     * auto-clear on privilege change.  PSFD is implied by SSBD, which is
+     * off by default.
+     */
+    if ( opt_psfd == -1 )
+        opt_psfd = 0;
+
+    if ( opt_psfd && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) )
+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_PSFD;
 
     /*
      * PV guests can poison the RSB to any virtual address from which