cpu_smpboot_alloc() is designed to be idempotent with respect to partially
initialised state. This occurs for S3 and CPU parking, where enough state to
handle NMIs/#MCs needs to remain valid for the entire lifetime of Xen, even
when we otherwise want to offline the CPU.
For simplicity between various configuration, Xen always uses shadow stack
mappings (Read-only + Dirty) for the guard page, irrespective of whether
CET-SS is enabled.
Unfortunately, the CET-SS changes in memguard_guard_stack() broke idempotency
by first writing out the supervisor shadow stack tokens with plain writes,
then changing the mapping to being read-only.
This ordering is strictly necessary to configure the BSP, which cannot have
the supervisor tokens be written with WRSS.
Instead of calling memguard_guard_stack() unconditionally, call it only when
actually allocating a new stack. Xenheap allocates are guaranteed to be
writeable, and the net result is idempotency WRT configuring stack_base[].
Fixes: 91d26ed304f ("x86/shstk: Create shadow stacks")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
memflags = MEMF_node(node);
if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL )
+ {
stack_base[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(STACK_ORDER, memflags);
- if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL )
- goto out;
+ if ( !stack_base[cpu] )
+ goto out;
+
+ memguard_guard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
+ }
info = get_cpu_info_from_stack((unsigned long)stack_base[cpu]);
info->processor_id = cpu;
info->per_cpu_offset = __per_cpu_offset[cpu];
- memguard_guard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
-
gdt = per_cpu(gdt, cpu) ?: alloc_xenheap_pages(0, memflags);
if ( gdt == NULL )
goto out;