x86/spec-ctrl: Make VERW flushing runtime conditional

Currently, VERW flushing to mitigate MDS is boot time conditional per domain
type.  However, to provide mitigations for DRPW (CVE-2022-21166), we need to
conditionally use VERW based on the trustworthiness of the guest, and the
devices passed through.

Remove the PV/HVM alternatives and instead issue a VERW on the return-to-guest
path depending on the SCF_verw bit in cpuinfo spec_ctrl_flags.

Introduce spec_ctrl_init_domain() and d->arch.verw to calculate the VERW
disposition at domain creation time, and context switch the SCF_verw bit.

For now, VERW flushing is used and controlled exactly as before, but later
patches will add per-domain cases too.

No change in behaviour.

This is part of XSA-404.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit e06b95c1d44ab80da255219fc9f1e2fc423edcb6)

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index 5467ae7168ffff47a74a104ee81b26559ee15a78..ad85785e14b3f5e1d50fa77ce10ac0bcfc6413f1 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -2129,9 +2129,8 @@ in place for guests to use.
 Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
 
 The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` offer fine
-grained control over the alternative blocks used by Xen.  These impact Xen's
-ability to protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests
-to use.
+grained control over the primitives by Xen.  These impact Xen's ability to
+protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use.
 
 * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests
   respectively.

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 3da81ebf1d4167015ecf1d3771982faba4f3efff..5ea5ef6ba0370292f1d0fa5b5a5b3900b26e129c 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d,
 
     domain_cpu_policy_changed(d);
 
+    spec_ctrl_init_domain(d);
+
     return 0;
 
  fail:
@@ -1763,14 +1765,15 @@ static void __context_switch(void)
 void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
 {
     unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+    struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info();
     const struct domain *prevd = prev->domain, *nextd = next->domain;
     unsigned int dirty_cpu = read_atomic(&next->dirty_cpu);
 
     ASSERT(prev != next);
     ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
 
-    get_cpu_info()->use_pv_cr3 = false;
-    get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0;
+    info->use_pv_cr3 = false;
+    info->xen_cr3 = 0;
 
     if ( unlikely(dirty_cpu != cpu) && dirty_cpu != VCPU_CPU_CLEAN )
     {
@@ -1834,6 +1837,11 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
                 *last_id = next_id;
             }
         }
+
+        /* Update the top-of-stack block with the VERW disposition. */
+        info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_verw;
+        if ( nextd->arch.verw )
+            info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_verw;
     }
 
     sched_context_switched(prev, next);

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
index 49651f3c435a71d45f6952076f6210d61c19217a..5f5de45a1309c7d667cc6755e7f3da269c3de9a9 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(realmode)
 
         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
         /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_VMX   Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo              Clob:    */
-        ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)), X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM
+        DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW
 
         mov  VCPU_hvm_guest_cr2(%rbx),%rax
 

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 1e226102d39956aa5a56514451c1415f5b6014ac..b4efc940aa2b150ffedfcb47b07b443f74fb1d50 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_pv = true;
 static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_hvm = true;
 static bool __initdata opt_rsb_pv = true;
 static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true;
-static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_pv = -1;
-static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_hvm = -1;
+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_pv = -1;
+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_hvm = -1;
 
 /* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */
 static enum ind_thunk {
@@ -903,6 +903,13 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(uint64_t caps)
     }
 }
 
+void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
+{
+    bool pv = is_pv_domain(d);
+
+    d->arch.verw = pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm;
+}
+
 void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
 {
     enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
@@ -1148,21 +1155,20 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
                             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR));
 
     /*
-     * Enable MDS defences as applicable.  The PV blocks need using all the
-     * time, and the Idle blocks need using if either PV or HVM defences are
-     * used.
+     * Enable MDS defences as applicable.  The Idle blocks need using if
+     * either PV or HVM defences are used.
      *
      * HVM is more complicated.  The MD_CLEAR microcode extends L1D_FLUSH with
-     * equivelent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the
-     * HVM path.  The HVM blocks don't need activating if our hypervisor told
-     * us it was handling L1D_FLUSH, or we are using L1D_FLUSH ourselves.
+     * equivalent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the
+     * HVM path.  Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH.
+     *
+     * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify
+     * opt_md_clear_hvm to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM
+     * guests", so spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings.
      */
-    if ( opt_md_clear_pv )
-        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV);
     if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm )
         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE);
-    if ( opt_md_clear_hvm && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush )
-        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM);
+    opt_md_clear_hvm &= !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush;
 
     /*
      * Warn the user if they are on MLPDS/MFBDS-vulnerable hardware with HT

diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
index 09f619459bc7fc65e672fefe39792b011c7da1c9..9eaab7a2a1fa83b88d215713b1a9855ddafbf7b7 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM,        X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP,     X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE,       X86_SYNTH(21)) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR,           X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_PV,        X86_SYNTH(23)) /* VERW used by Xen for PV */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM,       X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */
+/* Bits 23,24 unused. */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE,      X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK,         X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT,           X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */

diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index 0db551bff344abcea9156b661999b883532b4538..4ee76bba45dafa37e84e767599518657be90b08d 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ struct arch_domain
     uint32_t pci_cf8;
     uint8_t cmos_idx;
 
+    /* Use VERW on return-to-guest for its flushing side effect. */
+    bool verw;
+
     union {
         struct pv_domain pv;
         struct hvm_domain hvm;

diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
index 9caecddfec964c428473bfb059ce8208e679e9f4..68f6c46c470cfa210886dbf4d4e89bf09cee82e9 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0)
 #define SCF_ist_wrmsr  (1 << 1)
 #define SCF_ist_rsb    (1 << 2)
+#define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
 
 void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
+void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d);
 
 extern bool opt_ibpb;
 extern bool opt_ssbd;

diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
index 02b3b18ce69f540df5ac48077ac17e6af2596713..5a590bac44aa729da77c63e62142e72776d93bf9 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW
+/*
+ * Requires %rsp=cpuinfo
+ *
+ * Issue a VERW for its flushing side effect, if indicated.  This is a Spectre
+ * v1 gadget, but the IRET/VMEntry is serialising.
+ */
+    testb $SCF_verw, CPUINFO_spec_ctrl_flags(%rsp)
+    jz .L\@_verw_skip
+    verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)
+.L\@_verw_skip:
+.endm
+
 .macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen:req
 /*
  * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen)
@@ -231,8 +244,7 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV                                            \
     ALTERNATIVE "",                                                     \
         DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV;              \
-    ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)),           \
-        X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV
+    DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW
 
 /*
  * Use in IST interrupt/exception context.  May interrupt Xen or PV context.