A broken or malicious guest can submit more requests than the virtqueue
size permits.
The guest can submit requests without bothering to wait for completion
and is therefore not bound by virtqueue size. This requires reusing
vring descriptors in more than one request, which is incorrect but
possible. Processing a request allocates a VirtQueueElement and
therefore causes unbounded memory allocation controlled by the guest.
Exit with an error if the guest provides more requests than the
virtqueue size permits. This bounds memory allocation and makes the
buggy guest visible to the user.
Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <zhenhaohong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit
c4e0d84d3c92923fdbc7fa922638d54e5e834753)
/* When we start there are none of either input nor output. */
elem->out_num = elem->in_num = 0;
+ if (vq->inuse >= vq->vring.num) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Virtqueue size exceeded");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
i = head = virtqueue_get_head(vq, vq->last_avail_idx++);
do {
struct iovec *sg;