x86: limit checks in hypercall_xlat_continuation() to actual arguments

HVM/PVH guests can otherwise trigger the final BUG_ON() in that
function by entering 64-bit mode, setting the high halves of affected
registers to non-zero values, leaving 64-bit mode, and issuing a
hypercall that might get preempted and hence become subject to
continuation argument translation (HYPERVISOR_memory_op being the only
one possible for HVM, PVH also having the option of using
HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op). This issue got introduced when HVM code was
switched to use compat_memory_op() - neither that nor
hypercall_xlat_continuation() were originally intended to be used by
other than PV guests (which can't enter 64-bit mode and hence have no
way to alter the high halves of 64-bit registers).

This is CVE-2014-8866 / XSA-111.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 2799e8618ca0319d96bebf2545137f546e5e95bf..8599655bac77c826109c74a7b85d679c94f6d973 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1921,7 +1921,8 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int mask, ...)
+int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int nr,
+                                unsigned int mask, ...)
 {
     int rc = 0;
     struct mc_state *mcs = &current->mc_state;
@@ -1930,7 +1931,10 @@ int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int mask, ...)
     unsigned long nval = 0;
     va_list args;
 
-    BUG_ON(id && *id > 5);
+    ASSERT(nr <= ARRAY_SIZE(mcs->call.args));
+    ASSERT(!(mask >> nr));
+
+    BUG_ON(id && *id >= nr);
     BUG_ON(id && (mask & (1U << *id)));
 
     va_start(args, mask);
@@ -1939,7 +1943,7 @@ int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int mask, ...)
     {
         if ( !test_bit(_MCSF_call_preempted, &mcs->flags) )
             return 0;
-        for ( i = 0; i < 6; ++i, mask >>= 1 )
+        for ( i = 0; i < nr; ++i, mask >>= 1 )
         {
             if ( mask & 1 )
             {
@@ -1967,7 +1971,7 @@ int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int mask, ...)
     else
     {
         regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
-        for ( i = 0; i < 6; ++i, mask >>= 1 )
+        for ( i = 0; i < nr; ++i, mask >>= 1 )
         {
             unsigned long *reg;
 

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
index ef7822b22d4c4a0d1f4c1f7a68fe6cf6cc4b04b9..8cf3c3a2f788422e81c2f290f7e90eb42943df32 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int compat_arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg)
         }
 
         if ( rc == __HYPERVISOR_memory_op )
-            hypercall_xlat_continuation(NULL, 0x2, nat, arg);
+            hypercall_xlat_continuation(NULL, 2, 0x2, nat, arg);
 
         break;
     }
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int compat_arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg)
             break;
 
         if ( rc == __HYPERVISOR_memory_op )
-            hypercall_xlat_continuation(NULL, 0x2, nat, arg);
+            hypercall_xlat_continuation(NULL, 2, 0x2, nat, arg);
 
         XLAT_pod_target(&cmp, nat);
 
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_compat_t) cmp_uops,
                 left = 1;
                 if ( arg1 != MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED )
                 {
-                    BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0x01, nat_ops,
+                    BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 4, 0x01, nat_ops,
                                                         cmp_uops));
                     if ( !test_bit(_MCSF_in_multicall, &mcs->flags) )
                         regs->_ecx += count - i;
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_compat_t) cmp_uops,
                         mcs->compat_call.args[1] += count - i;
                 }
                 else
-                    BUG_ON(hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0));
+                    BUG_ON(hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 4, 0));
                 BUG_ON(left != arg1);
             }
             else

diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
index 2355cb9762401c61581fcbbe5e25d65e843370ba..3c8b97d1137757c3921018fb0491a2987f3db396 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) compat)
             break;
 
         cmd = 0;
-        if ( hypercall_xlat_continuation(&cmd, 0x02, nat.hnd, compat) )
+        if ( hypercall_xlat_continuation(&cmd, 2, 0x02, nat.hnd, compat) )
         {
             BUG_ON(rc != __HYPERVISOR_memory_op);
             BUG_ON((cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK) != op);

diff --git a/xen/include/xen/compat.h b/xen/include/xen/compat.h
index 857cbc77c868ba816ee8e32827ac7332c06430ee..4f6af7069ad45f61234ee33d2ecddcf1eb98b592 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/xen/compat.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/compat.h
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ static inline int name(k xen_ ## n *x, k compat_ ## n *c) \
  * This option is useful for extracting the "op" argument or similar from the
  * hypercall to enable further xlat processing.
  *
+ * nr: Total number of arguments the hypercall has.
+ *
  * mask: Specifies which of the hypercall arguments require compat translation.
  * bit 0 indicates that the 0'th argument requires translation, bit 1 indicates
  * that the first argument requires translation and so on. Native and compat
@@ -211,7 +213,8 @@ static inline int name(k xen_ ## n *x, k compat_ ## n *c) \
  *
  * Return: Number of arguments which were actually translated.
  */
-int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int mask, ...);
+int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int nr,
+                                unsigned int mask, ...);
 
 /* In-place translation functons: */
 struct start_info;