x86/spec-ctrl: Support BHI_DIS_S in order to mitigate BHI

Introduce a "bhi-dis-s" boolean to match the other options we have for
MSR_SPEC_CTRL values.  Also introduce bhi_calculations().

Use BHI_DIS_S whenever possible.

Guests which are levelled to be migration compatible with older CPUs can't see
BHI_DIS_S, and Xen must fill in the difference to make the guest safe.  Use
the virt MSR_SPEC_CTRL infrastructure to force BHI_DIS_S behind the guest's
back.

This is part of XSA-456 / CVE-2024-2201.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 62a1106415c5e8a49b45147ca84d54a58d471343)

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index e1d56407dd880b5cd1b1b53ce64cd9926e0aed4d..0b0abf89830c2be4c07eb1d2fbb62ac4db9699bc 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -2327,7 +2327,8 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
 >              {msr-sc,rsb,verw,ibpb-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
 >              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
 >              eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
->              unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden}=<bool> ]`
+>              unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden,
+>              bhi-dis-s}=<bool> ]`
 
 Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations.  By default, Xen
 will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
@@ -2408,6 +2409,11 @@ option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.  By
 default, Xen will not use PSFD.  PSFD is implied by SSBD, and SSBD is off by
 default.
 
+On hardware supporting BHI_DIS_S (Branch History Injection Disable
+Supervisor), the `bhi-dis-s=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using
+the feature itself.  By default Xen will use BHI_DIS_S on hardware susceptible
+to Branch History Injection.
+
 On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=`
 option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch
 prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 38d6d78607630b4b85081ac3c677f9d8aebd46f9..e5259ed034a3b9bb0db6b1946b8168e11684c91a 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <asm/event.h>
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/monitor.h>
+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
 #include <public/arch-x86/cpuid.h>
 
 static bool_t __initdata opt_force_ept;
@@ -783,6 +784,22 @@ static void cf_check vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
             vmx_del_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
     }
 
+    if ( cpu_has_vmx_virt_spec_ctrl )
+    {
+        /*
+         * If we're on BHI_DIS_S capable hardware, the short loop sequence is
+         * not sufficient to mitigate Native-BHI.  If the VM can't see it
+         * (i.e. it's levelled with older hardware), force it behind the
+         * guests back for safey.
+         *
+         * Because there's not a real Host/Guest split of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+         * value, this only works as expected when Xen is using BHI_DIS_S too.
+         */
+        bool force_bhi_dis_s = opt_bhi_dis_s && !cp->feat.bhi_ctrl;
+
+        __vmwrite(SPEC_CTRL_MASK, force_bhi_dis_s ? SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S : 0);
+    }
+
     /* MSR_PRED_CMD is safe to pass through if the guest knows about it. */
     if ( cp->feat.ibrsb || cp->extd.ibpb )
         vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_PRED_CMD,  VMX_MSR_RW);

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
index 7048e5ee2101e3169d49f1b3c60156f6b3ac0885..617209202b916ba76891db6af587d29e2f007ef7 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static always_inline void spec_ctrl_new_guest_context(void)
 
 extern int8_t opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch;
 extern bool opt_ssbd;
+extern int8_t opt_bhi_dis_s;
 extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu;
 extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush;
 

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 5ccd82f161c32f99a27256fbfa66469c79e22fe7..085e37525d70bf720844364296a0f4b55d777947 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1;
 int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1;
 bool __ro_after_init opt_ssbd;
 int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1;
+int8_t __ro_after_init opt_bhi_dis_s = -1;
 
 int8_t __ro_after_init opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = -1;
 int8_t __ro_after_init opt_eager_fpu = -1;
@@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
             opt_ssbd = val;
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("psfd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
             opt_psfd = val;
+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("bhi-dis-s", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+            opt_bhi_dis_s = val;
 
         /* Misc settings. */
         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
                "\n");
 
     /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
-    printk("  Xen settings: %s%sSPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+    printk("  Xen settings: %s%sSPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
            thunk != THUNK_NONE      ? "BTI-Thunk: " : "",
            thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "" :
            thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE, " :
@@ -554,6 +557,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
            (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) &&
             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PSFD))   ? "" :
            (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_PSFD)  ? " PSFD+" : " PSFD-",
+           !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL)       ? "" :
+           (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S) ? " BHI_DIS_S+" : " BHI_DIS_S-",
            !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)              ? "" :
            (opt_tsx & 1)                             ? " TSX+" : " TSX-",
            !cpu_has_srbds_ctrl                       ? "" :
@@ -1608,6 +1613,21 @@ static void __init gds_calculations(void)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
+ */
+static void __init bhi_calculations(void)
+{
+    if ( opt_bhi_dis_s == -1 )
+        opt_bhi_dis_s = !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_NO);
+
+    if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL) )
+        opt_bhi_dis_s = false;
+
+    if ( opt_bhi_dis_s )
+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S;
+}
+
 void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
 {
     bool pv = is_pv_domain(d);
@@ -2152,6 +2172,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
 
     gds_calculations();
 
+    bhi_calculations();
+
     print_details(thunk);
 
     /*