VT-d: fix (de)assign ordering when RMRRs are in use

In the event that the RMRR mappings are essential for device operation,
they should be established before updating the device's context entry,
while they should be torn down only after the device's context entry was
successfully updated.

Also adjust a related log message.

This is CVE-2022-26358 / part of XSA-400.

Fixes: 8b99f4400b69 ("VT-d: fix RMRR related error handling")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 78a40f8b5dfa1a3aec43528663f39473d4429101
master date: 2022-04-05 14:15:33 +0200

diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index 410dc216b2f83df8a8aca87b87d5b00a19dbece4..1f04f0b4cf30ee8286cd15295cb8bf9f1c6aa145 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2352,6 +2352,10 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
 {
     int ret;
 
+    ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
+    if ( ret )
+        return ret;
+
     /*
      * Devices assigned to untrusted domains (here assumed to be any domU)
      * can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected
@@ -2388,10 +2392,6 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
             }
     }
 
-    ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
-    if ( ret )
-        return ret;
-
     if ( devfn == pdev->devfn && pdev->domain != dom_io )
     {
         list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
@@ -2468,9 +2468,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
         }
     }
 
-    ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
-    if ( ret || d == dom_io )
-        return ret;
+    if ( d == dom_io )
+        return reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
 
     /* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
     for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
@@ -2483,20 +2482,37 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
                                          rmrr->end_address, flag);
             if ( ret )
             {
-                int rc;
-
-                rc = reassign_device_ownership(d, s, devfn, pdev);
                 printk(XENLOG_G_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                       " cannot map reserved region (%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"] for Dom%d (%d)\n",
-                       rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address,
-                       d->domain_id, ret);
-                if ( rc )
-                {
-                    printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                           " failed to reclaim %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from %pd (%d)\n",
-                           seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), d, rc);
-                    domain_crash(d);
-                }
+                       "%pd: cannot map reserved region [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"]: %d\n",
+                       d, rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address, ret);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( !ret )
+        ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
+
+    /* See reassign_device_ownership() for the hwdom aspect. */
+    if ( !ret || is_hardware_domain(d) )
+        return ret;
+
+    for_each_rmrr_device( rmrr, bdf, i )
+    {
+        if ( rmrr->segment == seg &&
+             PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
+             PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
+        {
+            int rc = iommu_identity_mapping(d, p2m_access_x,
+                                            rmrr->base_address,
+                                            rmrr->end_address, 0);
+
+            if ( rc && rc != -ENOENT )
+            {
+                printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
+                       "%pd: cannot unmap reserved region [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"]: %d\n",
+                       d, rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address, rc);
+                domain_crash(d);
                 break;
             }
         }