]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commitdiff
VT-d: avoid NULL deref on domain_context_mapping_one() error paths
authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fri, 8 Apr 2022 13:05:56 +0000 (15:05 +0200)
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fri, 8 Apr 2022 13:05:56 +0000 (15:05 +0200)
First there's a printk() which actually wrongly uses pdev in the first
place: We want to log the coordinates of the (perhaps fake) device
acted upon, which may not be pdev.

Then it was quite pointless for eb19326a328d ("VT-d: prepare for per-
device quarantine page tables (part I)") to add a domid_t parameter to
domain_context_unmap_one(): It's only used to pass back here via
me_wifi_quirk() -> map_me_phantom_function(). Drop the parameter again.

Finally there's the invocation of domain_context_mapping_one(), which
needs to be passed the correct domain ID. Avoid taking that path when
pdev is NULL and the quarantine state is what would need restoring to.
This means we can't security-support non-PCI-Express devices with RMRRs
(if such exist in practice) any longer; note that as of trhe 1st of the
two commits referenced below assigning them to DomU-s is unsupported
anyway.

Fixes: 8f41e481b485 ("VT-d: re-assign devices directly")
Fixes: 14dd241aad8a ("IOMMU/x86: use per-device page tables for quarantining")
Coverity ID: 1503784
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 608394b906e71587f02e6662597bc985bad33a5a
master date: 2022-04-07 12:30:19 +0200

xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c

index 897dcff9ff5aa02c081fe81da093c63d7e1e9d3a..fbe951b2fad0920d02b5544f89a72e589a37a823 100644 (file)
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(struct domain *domain, struct vtd_iommu *iommu,
                                const struct pci_dev *pdev, domid_t domid,
                                paddr_t pgd_maddr, unsigned int mode);
 int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct vtd_iommu *iommu,
-                             uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn, domid_t domid);
+                             uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn);
 int intel_iommu_get_reserved_device_memory(iommu_grdm_t *func, void *ctxt);
 
 unsigned int io_apic_read_remap_rte(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg);
index 6f4cd4885533bdad9e8561f52538ef8aa69c8a3f..567ac62983fbd32d800f3eb5fbbeee3546981917 100644 (file)
@@ -1530,7 +1530,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
                 check_cleanup_domid_map(domain, pdev, iommu);
             printk(XENLOG_ERR
                    "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: unexpected context entry %016lx_%016lx (expected %016lx_%016lx)\n",
-                   pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+                   seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
                    (uint64_t)(res >> 64), (uint64_t)res,
                    (uint64_t)(old >> 64), (uint64_t)old);
             rc = -EILSEQ;
@@ -1598,9 +1598,14 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
 
     if ( rc )
     {
-        if ( !prev_dom )
-            ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn,
-                                           DEVICE_DOMID(domain, pdev));
+        if ( !prev_dom ||
+             /*
+              * Unmapping here means DEV_TYPE_PCI devices with RMRRs (if such
+              * exist) would cause problems if such a region was actually
+              * accessed.
+              */
+             (prev_dom == dom_io && !pdev) )
+            ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
         else if ( prev_dom != domain ) /* Avoid infinite recursion. */
             ret = domain_context_mapping_one(prev_dom, iommu, bus, devfn, pdev,
                                              DEVICE_DOMID(prev_dom, pdev),
@@ -1742,7 +1747,9 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct domain *domain, u8 devfn,
          * Strictly speaking if the device is the only one behind this bridge
          * and the only one with this (secbus,0,0) tuple, it could be allowed
          * to be re-assigned regardless of RMRR presence.  But let's deal with
-         * that case only if it is actually found in the wild.
+         * that case only if it is actually found in the wild.  Note that
+         * dealing with this just here would still not render the operation
+         * secure.
          */
         else if ( prev_present && (mode & MAP_WITH_RMRR) &&
                   domain != pdev->domain )
@@ -1808,7 +1815,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct domain *domain, u8 devfn,
 int domain_context_unmap_one(
     struct domain *domain,
     struct vtd_iommu *iommu,
-    uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn, domid_t domid)
+    uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn)
 {
     struct context_entry *context, *context_entries;
     u64 maddr;
@@ -1860,7 +1867,8 @@ int domain_context_unmap_one(
     unmap_vtd_domain_page(context_entries);
 
     if ( !iommu->drhd->segment && !rc )
-        rc = me_wifi_quirk(domain, bus, devfn, domid, 0, UNMAP_ME_PHANTOM_FUNC);
+        rc = me_wifi_quirk(domain, bus, devfn, DOMID_INVALID, 0,
+                           UNMAP_ME_PHANTOM_FUNC);
 
     if ( rc && !is_hardware_domain(domain) && domain != dom_io )
     {
@@ -1915,8 +1923,7 @@ static const struct acpi_drhd_unit *domain_context_unmap(
             printk(VTDPREFIX "d%d:PCIe: unmap %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
                    domain->domain_id, seg, bus,
                    PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
-        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn,
-                                       DEVICE_DOMID(domain, pdev));
+        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
         if ( !ret && devfn == pdev->devfn && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 )
             disable_ats_device(pdev);
 
@@ -1926,8 +1933,7 @@ static const struct acpi_drhd_unit *domain_context_unmap(
         if ( iommu_debug )
             printk(VTDPREFIX "d%d:PCI: unmap %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
                    domain->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
-        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn,
-                                       DEVICE_DOMID(domain, pdev));
+        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
         if ( ret )
             break;
 
@@ -1950,12 +1956,10 @@ static const struct acpi_drhd_unit *domain_context_unmap(
             break;
         }
 
-        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn,
-                                       DEVICE_DOMID(domain, pdev));
+        ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn);
         /* PCIe to PCI/PCIx bridge */
         if ( !ret && pdev_type(seg, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
-            ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, secbus, 0,
-                                           DEVICE_DOMID(domain, pdev));
+            ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, secbus, 0);
 
         break;
 
index c0deef556b80e1c72e6f265a57c5f0fe8adde19e..40a616724831ae1b6016c3ab4a8039d2e062ffa7 100644 (file)
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static int __must_check map_me_phantom_function(struct domain *domain,
                                         domid, pgd_maddr, mode);
     else
         rc = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, drhd->iommu, 0,
-                                      PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7), domid);
+                                      PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7));
 
     return rc;
 }