slirp: Add sanity check for str option length

When user provides a long domainname or hostname that doesn't fit in the
DHCP packet, we mustn't overflow the response packet buffer. Instead,
report errors, following the g_warning() in the slirp->vdnssearch
branch.

Also check the strlen against 256 when initializing slirp, which limit
is also from the protocol where one byte represents the string length.
This gives an early error before the warning which is harder to notice
or diagnose.

Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>

diff --git a/net/slirp.c b/net/slirp.c
index 99884de2046d5da9decff0ccb990f9b9a6481c3b..da6c0a1a5c0cb4a4b4a6c13c20c972434ed6aeb9 100644 (file)
--- a/net/slirp.c
+++ b/net/slirp.c
@@ -350,6 +350,15 @@ static int net_slirp_init(NetClientState *peer, const char *model,
         return -1;
     }
 
+    if (vdomainname && strlen(vdomainname) > 255) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'domainname' parameter cannot exceed 255 bytes");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (vhostname && strlen(vhostname) > 255) {
+        error_setg(errp, "'vhostname' parameter cannot exceed 255 bytes");
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     nc = qemu_new_net_client(&net_slirp_info, peer, model, name);
 

diff --git a/slirp/bootp.c b/slirp/bootp.c
index 9e7b53ba94286e86fbaa6d09d82686e4445660d1..1e8185f0ecae0857497cc326278f7353e2d29243 100644 (file)
--- a/slirp/bootp.c
+++ b/slirp/bootp.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t *bp)
     struct in_addr preq_addr;
     int dhcp_msg_type, val;
     uint8_t *q;
+    uint8_t *end;
     uint8_t client_ethaddr[ETH_ALEN];
 
     /* extract exact DHCP msg type */
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t *bp)
     rbp->bp_siaddr = saddr.sin_addr; /* Server IP address */
 
     q = rbp->bp_vend;
+    end = (uint8_t *)&rbp[1];
     memcpy(q, rfc1533_cookie, 4);
     q += 4;
 
@@ -292,24 +294,33 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t *bp)
 
         if (*slirp->client_hostname) {
             val = strlen(slirp->client_hostname);
-            *q++ = RFC1533_HOSTNAME;
-            *q++ = val;
-            memcpy(q, slirp->client_hostname, val);
-            q += val;
+            if (q + val + 2 >= end) {
+                g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
+                    "omitting host name option.");
+            } else {
+                *q++ = RFC1533_HOSTNAME;
+                *q++ = val;
+                memcpy(q, slirp->client_hostname, val);
+                q += val;
+            }
         }
 
         if (slirp->vdomainname) {
             val = strlen(slirp->vdomainname);
-            *q++ = RFC1533_DOMAINNAME;
-            *q++ = val;
-            memcpy(q, slirp->vdomainname, val);
-            q += val;
+            if (q + val + 2 >= end) {
+                g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
+                    "omitting domain name option.");
+            } else {
+                *q++ = RFC1533_DOMAINNAME;
+                *q++ = val;
+                memcpy(q, slirp->vdomainname, val);
+                q += val;
+            }
         }
 
         if (slirp->vdnssearch) {
-            size_t spaceleft = sizeof(rbp->bp_vend) - (q - rbp->bp_vend);
             val = slirp->vdnssearch_len;
-            if (val + 1 > spaceleft) {
+            if (q + val >= end) {
                 g_warning("DHCP packet size exceeded, "
                     "omitting domain-search option.");
             } else {
@@ -331,6 +342,7 @@ static void bootp_reply(Slirp *slirp, const struct bootp_t *bp)
         memcpy(q, nak_msg, sizeof(nak_msg) - 1);
         q += sizeof(nak_msg) - 1;
     }
+    assert(q < end);
     *q = RFC1533_END;
 
     daddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0xffffffffu;