]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commitdiff
x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tue, 14 Mar 2017 11:40:36 +0000 (12:40 +0100)
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tue, 14 Mar 2017 11:40:36 +0000 (12:40 +0100)
hvm_hw_cpu->msr_flags is in fact the VMX dirty bitmap of MSRs needing to be
restored when switching into guest context.  It should never have been part of
the migration state to start with, and Xen must not make any decisions based
on the value seen during restore.

Identify it as obsolete in the header files, consistently save it as zero and
ignore it on restore.

The MSRs must be considered dirty during VMCS creation to cause the proper
defaults of 0 to be visible to the guest.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 2f1add6e1c8789d979daaafa3d80ddc1bc375783
master date: 2017-02-21 11:06:39 +0000

xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h

index 37bd6c4b18fbd479e997c9752a76b24bc59db4de..8edc846a2ed4aec6a5711d272adbb10aaa741c27 100644 (file)
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static void svm_save_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
     data->msr_cstar        = vmcb->cstar;
     data->msr_syscall_mask = vmcb->sfmask;
     data->msr_efer         = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer;
-    data->msr_flags        = -1ULL;
+    data->msr_flags        = 0;
 }
 
 
index 78795565683e6a2d1e7157524bdd5cdf04c006fc..4646ecc28d0b5b6cd3766831dd3ec213a1d8bcba 100644 (file)
@@ -1104,6 +1104,9 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
             vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
     }
 
+    /* All guest MSR state is dirty. */
+    v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state.flags = ((1u << VMX_MSR_COUNT) - 1);
+
     /* I/O access bitmap. */
     __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap));
     __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap) + PAGE_SIZE);
index 8949ad6e3c28acec2e3f403a3729968f7a8b67e1..9a42e2e53339c42e067a3bc002face572829a319 100644 (file)
@@ -739,13 +739,12 @@ static int vmx_vmcs_restore(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *c)
 static void vmx_save_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
 {
     struct vmx_msr_state *guest_state = &v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state;
-    unsigned long guest_flags = guest_state->flags;
 
     data->shadow_gs = v->arch.hvm_vmx.shadow_gs;
     data->msr_cstar = v->arch.hvm_vmx.cstar;
 
     /* save msrs */
-    data->msr_flags        = guest_flags;
+    data->msr_flags        = 0;
     data->msr_lstar        = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_LSTAR];
     data->msr_star         = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_STAR];
     data->msr_syscall_mask = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_SYSCALL_MASK];
@@ -756,7 +755,7 @@ static void vmx_load_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
     struct vmx_msr_state *guest_state = &v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state;
 
     /* restore msrs */
-    guest_state->flags = data->msr_flags & 7;
+    guest_state->flags = ((1u << VMX_MSR_COUNT) - 1);
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_LSTAR]        = data->msr_lstar;
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_STAR]         = data->msr_star;
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_SYSCALL_MASK] = data->msr_syscall_mask;
index 8d73b51f061e1ad4e5c725d2302a918c635cee6e..419a3b23d44e73f155769ade82a07b20ca73391e 100644 (file)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct hvm_hw_cpu {
     uint64_t shadow_gs;
 
     /* msr content saved/restored. */
-    uint64_t msr_flags;
+    uint64_t msr_flags; /* Obsolete, ignored. */
     uint64_t msr_lstar;
     uint64_t msr_star;
     uint64_t msr_cstar;
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ struct hvm_hw_cpu_compat {
     uint64_t shadow_gs;
 
     /* msr content saved/restored. */
-    uint64_t msr_flags;
+    uint64_t msr_flags; /* Obsolete, ignored. */
     uint64_t msr_lstar;
     uint64_t msr_star;
     uint64_t msr_cstar;