Win2k8 x64 reads this MSR on revF chips, where it wasn't publically
available; it uses a magic constant in %rdi as a password, which we
don't have in rdmsr_safe(). Since we'll ignore the later writes, just
use a plausible value here (the reset value from rev10h chips) if the
real CPU didn't provide one.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 24990:
322300fd2ebd
xen-unstable date: Thu Mar 08 09:17:21 2012 +0000
svm: amend c/s 24990:
322300fd2ebd (fake BU_CFG MSR on AMD revF)
Let's restrict such a hack to the known affected family.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25058:
f47d91cb0faa
xen-unstable date: Thu Mar 15 15:09:18 2012 +0100
break;
}
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xf && ecx == MSR_F10_BU_CFG )
+ {
+ /* Win2k8 x64 reads this MSR on revF chips, where it
+ * wasn't publically available; it uses a magic constant
+ * in %rdi as a password, which we don't have in
+ * rdmsr_safe(). Since we'll ignore the later writes,
+ * just use a plausible value here (the reset value from
+ * rev10h chips) if the real CPU didn't provide one. */
+ msr_content = 0x0000000010200020ull;
+ break;
+ }
+
goto gpf;
}
#define MSR_F10_MC4_MISC2 0xc0000409
#define MSR_F10_MC4_MISC3 0xc000040A
+/* AMD Family10h MMU control MSRs */
+#define MSR_F10_BU_CFG 0xc0011023
+
/* Other AMD Fam10h MSRs */
#define MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE 0xc0010058
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_ENABLE (1<<0)