]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - qemu-xen.git/commitdiff
pcnet: force the buffer access to be in bounds during tx qemu-xen-4.4.3-rc1
authorPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Sun, 24 May 2015 08:53:44 +0000 (10:53 +0200)
committerStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Wed, 10 Jun 2015 11:45:20 +0000 (11:45 +0000)
4096 is the maximum length per TMD and it is also currently the size of
the relay buffer pcnet driver uses for sending the packet data to QEMU
for further processing. With packet spanning multiple TMDs it can
happen that the overall packet size will be bigger than sizeof(buffer),
which results in memory corruption.

Fix this by only allowing to queue maximum sizeof(buffer) bytes.

This is CVE-2015-3209.

Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Matt Tait <matttait@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
hw/net/pcnet.c

index f641e4f1c110e43fef380df0ade94f8123e0243f..00fc409ac899e426826a6caa5730c3255442c53a 100644 (file)
@@ -1254,6 +1254,14 @@ static void pcnet_transmit(PCNetState *s)
         }
 
         bcnt = 4096 - GET_FIELD(tmd.length, TMDL, BCNT);
+
+        /* if multi-tmd packet outsizes s->buffer then skip it silently.
+           Note: this is not what real hw does */
+        if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer)) {
+            s->xmit_pos = -1;
+            goto txdone;
+        }
+
         s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s, tmd.tbadr),
                          s->buffer + s->xmit_pos, bcnt, CSR_BSWP(s));
         s->xmit_pos += bcnt;