docs: Use https:// links in preference to http://

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

diff --git a/docs/mainpage.dox b/docs/mainpage.dox
index 7fd5cf6ab7a5b650c4eb15f8e2a6050ec17498f0..4b09ce15005c3ac163c3d5a7a85d1c63ba585504 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/mainpage.dox
+++ b/docs/mainpage.dox
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ To run tests on a Xen host: (see @ref errata first)
 @section history History
 
 The Xen Test Framework grew out of the work done to debug
-[XSA-106](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-106.html).  As reported, Xen's
+[XSA-106](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-106.html).  As reported, Xen's
 instruction emulator failed to perform dpl checks for instructions generating
 software exceptions, which allowed guest userspace to bypass a security check
 set up by the guest kernel.  Further investigation showed that the exception
@@ -122,11 +122,11 @@ doing this, it was observed that different hardware was behaving differently
 not behaving as described in the manual.
 
 Once the embargo on XSA-106 lifted, changesets
-[7dfa94c](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+[7dfa94c](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
 ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=7dfa94c6212b979cbfc8cff5ad5336922f4809d9),
-[ecf5678](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+[ecf5678](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
 ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=ecf5678200ad2642b69ffea47ad138190bc3e190) and
-[36ebf14](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+[36ebf14](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
 ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=36ebf14ebe60310aa22952cbb94de951c158437d) were the
 eventual bugfixes which caused Xen to inject software exceptions correctly.
 
@@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ progressed only in the authors copious free time, when more important tasks
 were not being done.
 
 Moving forward by a year, the author was dismayed to discover that the
-[XSA-156](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-156.html) release contained a
+[XSA-156](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-156.html) release contained a
 regression (causing infinite loops inside guests which used hardware debugging
-facilities, fixed in [0747bc8](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+facilities, fixed in [0747bc8](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
 ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=0747bc8b4d85f3fc0ee1e58418418fa0229e8ff8)) which
 would have been caught by the original test for XSA-106, had that test been in
 a usable state.

diff --git a/include/xen/errno.h b/include/xen/errno.h
index 148ffb73746ce87e3136ec3cf835d0797413ffd7..8e4de2eb3690bf8fb0004dfd9866e2516d9a3043 100644 (file)
--- a/include/xen/errno.h
+++ b/include/xen/errno.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  *
  * The set of identifiers to be added here shouldn't extend beyond what
  * POSIX mandates (see e.g.
- * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/errno.h.html)
+ * https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/errno.h.html)
  * with the exception that we support some optional (XSR) values
  * specified there (but no new ones should be added).
  */

diff --git a/make-new-test.sh b/make-new-test.sh
index 2036eb6200a9848a88f4815540c89d6a3d7f84eb..cbfd5edde1448608e7bdd889a9d03f73c9aebb0d 100755 (executable)
--- a/make-new-test.sh
+++ b/make-new-test.sh
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ else
     cat <<EOF
  * @page test-$NAME $NAME_UC
  *
- * Advisory: [$NAME_UC](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-${NAME#xsa-}.html)
+ * Advisory: [$NAME_UC](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-${NAME#xsa-}.html)
 EOF
 fi
 

diff --git a/tests/debug-regs/main.c b/tests/debug-regs/main.c
index 60c7c862d136015ffc5702cca26729b5a9fc6b08..9d4b74e9284baacd51f8a60bdfd2b41312f4a366 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/debug-regs/main.c
+++ b/tests/debug-regs/main.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * The following general tests are implemented:
  *
  * 1.  Xen, before
- *     [46029da12e](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=46029da12e5efeca6d957e5793bd34f2965fa0a1)
+ *     [46029da12e](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=46029da12e5efeca6d957e5793bd34f2965fa0a1)
  *     failed to initialise the guests debug registers correctly.  On hardware
  *     which supports Restricted Transactional Memory, this becomes visible,
  *     as @%dr6.rtm appears asserted (clear, for backwards compatibility)
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
  * The following PV tests are implemented:
  *
  * 1.  Xen, between
- *     [65e3554908](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=65e355490817ac1783c9ef06c13cf980edf05b5b)
+ *     [65e3554908](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=65e355490817ac1783c9ef06c13cf980edf05b5b)
  *     (Introduced in Xen 4.5) and
- *     [adf8feba1a](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=adf8feba1afa040f3a84a82953e18af02060884a)
+ *     [adf8feba1a](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=adf8feba1afa040f3a84a82953e18af02060884a)
  *     (Fixed in Xen 4.11) had a bug whereby some writes to @%dr7 didn't take
  *     immediate effect.
  *
@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@
  *     reschedule.
  *
  * 2.  Xen, before
- *     [f539ae2706](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=f539ae27061c6811fd5e80e0755bf0514e22b977)
+ *     [f539ae2706](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=f539ae27061c6811fd5e80e0755bf0514e22b977)
  *     (Xen 4.11) had a bug whereby a write which cleared @%dr7.L/G would
  *     leave stale IO shadow state visible in later reads of @%dr7.
  *
  *     Unfortunately, that changeset introduced a second bug, fixed by
- *     [237c31b5a1](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=237c31b5a1d5aa88cdb59b8c31b1b62eb13e82d1)
+ *     [237c31b5a1](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=237c31b5a1d5aa88cdb59b8c31b1b62eb13e82d1)
  *     (Xen 4.11), which caused an attempt to set up an IO breakpoint with
  *     @%cr4.DE clear to clobber an already configured state, despite the
  *     update failing.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-122/main.c b/tests/xsa-122/main.c
index ff8a12df9e76fab8ff8a7b508d4ebc65fe891904..2cffa52be449c90aa5844ef3b989c5bcfd3ed658 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-122/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-122/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-122 XSA-122
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-122](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-122.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-122](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-122.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-122, Xen would fill a fixed size stack array with a
  * NUL-terminated string, and copy the entire array back to guest space.  This

diff --git a/tests/xsa-123/main.c b/tests/xsa-123/main.c
index eab70f3d5e0a9886329ed6fdb05c9d97cf51843c..7d372cfdb6736bed27c1c08f5c2db7aa39c978f7 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-123/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-123/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-123 XSA-123
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-123](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-123.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-123](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-123.html)
  *
  * An x86 instruction destination operand is either a memory reference or a
  * register.  Memory references always have an associated selector, and

diff --git a/tests/xsa-167/main.c b/tests/xsa-167/main.c
index 52664cb70b29d9091eb9591aa66a2084d230cb27..c00409a8e1b16edb6b1383d052c971999e89d1f0 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-167/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-167/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-167 XSA-167
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-167](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-167.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-167](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-167.html)
  *
  * The MMUEXT subops MARK_SUPER and UNMARK_SUPER do not perform a range check
  * on the `mfn` parameter before indexing the superframe array.  They do

diff --git a/tests/xsa-168/main.c b/tests/xsa-168/main.c
index d6d12506c1103704ffcd46e5084c3a0eb2fa4d42..add7ce8ddba4c84de96b8c4cb8017e14666ff22a 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-168/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-168/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-168 XSA-168
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-168](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-168.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-168](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-168.html)
  *
  * This vulnerability only affects VT-x hardware, and can only exploited by a
  * guest running with shadow paging.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-170/main.c b/tests/xsa-170/main.c
index 5a98074b41ffb8ff20a837540a9898915a0b2f4a..70ee510b00ae86251d06b39ff3cb25bf8242e2d5 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-170/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-170/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-170 XSA-170
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-170](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-170.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-170](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-170.html)
  *
  * XSA-170 concerns a vmentry quirk on VMX hardware, which causes the vmentry
  * to fail if @%rip is non-canonical.  This bug does not affect SVM hardware,

diff --git a/tests/xsa-173/main.c b/tests/xsa-173/main.c
index cfb706e134f11433d3c4f843a80cfaceeae3f944..14a1ce4edbcd18338012893535c626934ceb7b09 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-173/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-173/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-173 XSA-173
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-173](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-173.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-173](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-173.html)
  *
  * This vulnerability only affects guests running with shadow paging.  Xen
  * truncated the shadowed gfn into a 32bit variable, causing issues later when

diff --git a/tests/xsa-182/main.c b/tests/xsa-182/main.c
index d441a761bcf23518024ed097ef36b8c3159821b7..14290dae4c27a4d8c04aa49113e7b831d4a0b30d 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-182/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-182/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-182 XSA-182
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-182](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-182.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-182](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-182.html)
  *
  * There is a trick with pagetables, known as recursive pagetables (also
  * linear or twisted pagetables), where a top level pagetable referrers back

diff --git a/tests/xsa-183/main.c b/tests/xsa-183/main.c
index 65c7f284a339cf84998adb9938d63e25782d7397..605e393399ec3e99b51a986882a64fc25e0134f6 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-183/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-183/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-183 XSA-183
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-183](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-183.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-183](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-183.html)
  *
  * This vulnerability only affects hardware supporting SMAP (Intel
  * Broadwell/AMD Zen or later) on Xen 4.5 or later (due to the addition of

diff --git a/tests/xsa-185/main.c b/tests/xsa-185/main.c
index 42b67716adbb3b0ddca6701cc2aba56910b5d9f4..5fab40f403d152ea533d1624a9c82297b623fba2 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-185/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-185/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-185 XSA-185
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-185](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-185.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-185](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-185.html)
  *
  * This vulnerability is along the same lines as XSA-182, and was uncovered
  * once XSA-182 had been fixed.  Please refer to 182 for the discussion of

diff --git a/tests/xsa-186/main.c b/tests/xsa-186/main.c
index cafcf16e27e4d39539355fde6f24e44d2698899b..d39eca83e3d7abdeedbae11e75be4e5571d14a20 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-186/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-186/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-186 XSA-186
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-186](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-186.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-186](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-186.html)
  *
  * Experimentally, Intel and AMD hardware is happy executing a 64bit
  * instruction stream which crosses the -1 -> 0 virtual boundary, whether the
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  * used and behaves normally as a 32bit register, including in 16bit protected
  * mode segments, as well as in Real and Unreal mode.
  *
- * The upstream change [0640ffb6](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+ * The upstream change [0640ffb6](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
  * ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=0640ffb67fb92e2561c63b9308c27b71281fdd72) broke
  * this behaviour, and introduced conditions which resulted in x86 emulator
  * state corruption.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-188/main.c b/tests/xsa-188/main.c
index 697b494230c4ba2ff2c80a7f4c3ea30a0d2abc35..207bbd9d386997b8a5effa838a7233d64fffdbf1 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-188/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-188/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-188 XSA-188
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-188](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-188.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-188](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-188.html)
  *
  * EVTCHNOP_init_control with an invalid control_gfn will correctly
  * fail and free resources but incorrectly leaves a pointer to freed

diff --git a/tests/xsa-191/main.c b/tests/xsa-191/main.c
index f360148e1cf5049585972b930e140da9e09204ed..2aa48fb3e1003c574f9ca36a8d4bc552b2d43c86 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-191/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-191/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-191 XSA-191
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-191](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-191.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-191](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-191.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-191, Xen had several bugs with its handling of segments which
  * shouldn't be eligible for use.  Memory accesses through user segments and

diff --git a/tests/xsa-192/main.c b/tests/xsa-192/main.c
index f94fac8f0b26d260138f8debf577a60667f7fbba..1cf0f97c87699ae0e2d43ac2053569e09a469e48 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-192/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-192/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-192 XSA-192
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-192](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-192.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-192](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-192.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-192, a bug existed with Xen's handling of task switches into
  * vm86 mode, whereby LDTR got loaded with vm86 attributes.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-193/main.c b/tests/xsa-193/main.c
index 312f52071d9ea6b4f553131c0b121cdf1bda6e01..970d63c5292f8bee05492fe698dc5fd87b4edebd 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-193/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-193/main.c
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-193 XSA-193
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-193](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-193.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-193](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-193.html)
  *
- * Xen change [c42494acb2](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+ * Xen change [c42494acb2](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
  * ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=c42494acb2f7f31e561d38f06c59a50ee4198f36)
  * switched wrmsr_safe() for wr{f,g}sbase(), neglecting to consider that they
  * internally may use plain wrmsr() or the `wr{f,g}sbase` instructions, both

diff --git a/tests/xsa-194/main.c b/tests/xsa-194/main.c
index f7e9c672abd3089bc431ae8e33dd853db9140ac5..bf31a992d158e1e62b17031401e3edec457194ec 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-194/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-194/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-194 XSA-194
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-194](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-194.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-194](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-194.html)
  *
  * When a guest requests BSD_SYMTAB, Some versions of libelf use a packed
  * struct containing an Elf header, and three Section headers.  These headers

diff --git a/tests/xsa-195/main.c b/tests/xsa-195/main.c
index eba390b44f33316169faa20a2ea03b8a79676fdd..a3b568cb40aec0c22ba3cc6aca94c44864420928 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-195/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-195/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-195 XSA-195
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-195](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-195.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-195](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-195.html)
  *
  * The `bt` family of instructions can reference an arbitrary bit offset from
  * their memory operand.  The x86 instruction emulator accounts for this by

diff --git a/tests/xsa-196/main.c b/tests/xsa-196/main.c
index 0c40729f4b9acd8e3137a4583c06e1aa91bf2828..272108c5a3fb9f21f5026277ac2986d7bb85b56a 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-196/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-196/main.c
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-196 XSA-196
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-196](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-196.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-196](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-196.html)
  *
- * Xen change [36ebf14ebe](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+ * Xen change [36ebf14ebe](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
  * ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=36ebf14ebe60310aa22952cbb94de951c158437d)
  * contained a bug when calculating the correct size of an IDT entry.
  *

diff --git a/tests/xsa-200/main.c b/tests/xsa-200/main.c
index 79737771bd4a8840396b6344301b87fa3f21371f..672abf2e86d131825af6aa27a571b4063880b378 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-200/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-200/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-200 XSA-200
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-200](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-200.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-200](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-200.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-200, the instruction emulator in Xen had a bug where it
  * incorrectly honoured the legacy operand-side override prefix for

diff --git a/tests/xsa-203/main.c b/tests/xsa-203/main.c
index e786577a1d4b165a44ee1704a84163f739e2ee14..eb37568a5dffb3bf9bc9bf4fee67ea688462b19f 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-203/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-203/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-203 XSA-203
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-203](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-203.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-203](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-203.html)
  *
  * Versions of Xen between 4.6 (when VMFUNC support was introduced) and
  * XSA-203, would follow a NULL function pointer on non-Intel hardware.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-204/main.c b/tests/xsa-204/main.c
index ac8c3c8b2c554fb7bfbe6737a94f1cc5a7580c5e..a8140b042b4a95b452710aea3593a9d5457b152e 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-204/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-204/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-204 XSA-204
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-204](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-204.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-204](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-204.html)
  *
  * SYSCALL (unlike most instructions) evaluates its singlestep action based on
  * the resulting EFLAGS.TF, not the starting EFLAGS.TF.  As the @#DB is raised

diff --git a/tests/xsa-212/main.c b/tests/xsa-212/main.c
index 50cc13a953dc26c5264196dae44053e06692c280..f1d97a3c68c0faf93b74086059a5aaccf5a59cf1 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-212/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-212/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-212 XSA-212
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-212](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-212.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-212](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-212.html)
  *
  * The XENMEM_exchange hypercall previously had incomplete checks on the
  * safety of the parameters passed.  XENMEM_exchange takes an input and output

diff --git a/tests/xsa-213/main.c b/tests/xsa-213/main.c
index d3e713b671ac5a8461c42ed1a9d3b6e6800c6b62..a0c8a1b0d1c00aacb8da47eba9ebd2443895b173 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-213/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-213/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-213 XSA-213
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-213](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-213.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-213](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-213.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-213, Xen would allow the use of __HYPERCALL_iret in a multicall.
  * __HYPERCALL_iret switches the guest from kernel mode into user mode, but

diff --git a/tests/xsa-221/main.c b/tests/xsa-221/main.c
index 824030b315f0acb9217b77de98a8f96bdd7b8e0c..499864082681be70fd32da6bec5af76ce5adbd20 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-221/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-221/main.c
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-221 XSA-221
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-221](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-221](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html)
  *
- * The upstream change [fbbd5009e6](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
+ * The upstream change [fbbd5009e6](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/
  * ?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=fbbd5009e6ed1201731b1727762070c1a988e67d)
  * neglected to check that ports were suitably initialised before
  * dereferencing their structure.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-224/main.c b/tests/xsa-224/main.c
index d334a53331df1e9b92625fe0b2d8f0305fdf638d..123608ba9afba998a44a20eb7d858fa60860940c 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-224/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-224/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-224 XSA-224
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-224](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-224](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html)
  *
  * XSA-224 has multiple CVEs assigned.  This testcase exercises CVE-2017-10920
  * specifically.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-227/main.c b/tests/xsa-227/main.c
index a32ec66617c9f498181057fd8cdd8604bcd0aebe..1750fc68e7b44e993d9b58c25bc948be770106c1 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-227/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-227/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-227 XSA-227
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-227](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-xsa-227.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-227](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-xsa-227.html)
  *
  * For x86 PV guests, the #GNTTABOP_map_grant_ref hypercall allows mapping by
  * nominated linear address, or by nominating a specific L1e.  However, there

diff --git a/tests/xsa-231/main.c b/tests/xsa-231/main.c
index 2771beb7d1b058129835c829fd75b502bf1eec30..fcc46477257041f00b5faad19ae8d79ab0837ab9 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-231/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-231/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-231 XSA-231
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-231](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-231.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-231](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-231.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-231, the node parameter in xen_memory_reservation was passed
  * unaudited into the heap allocator, which ASSERT()ed it was range, then

diff --git a/tests/xsa-232/main.c b/tests/xsa-232/main.c
index 2f649f9ba8cb70d6261e0978db42b2b3fbcf094b..e8eddc35c2f6fc08e93135be5c5cfb156d6c9b67 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-232/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-232/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-232 XSA-232
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-232](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-232.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-232](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-232.html)
  *
  * GNTTABOP_cache_flush takes a machine address, looks up the page owner and
  * unconditionally follows the owners grant table pointer.  For system domains

diff --git a/tests/xsa-234/main.c b/tests/xsa-234/main.c
index f28a7e3dc3ea8fc654c3b0b8fe84d0e2358e7ce0..2b65ef2015109ae8780b86355993043c408848b1 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-234/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-234/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-234 XSA-234
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-234](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-234.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-234](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-234.html)
  *
  * Various grant unmapping operations will succeed and drop a writeable
  * reference count, even when the mapping was only read-only.  This can be

diff --git a/tests/xsa-239/main.c b/tests/xsa-239/main.c
index 79f68100b6c2f05d52cc37f69b426824482ccdfa..0e0bb9fb0cdaba483736a06bb4edfb25454897ad 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-239/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-239/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-239 XSA-239
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-239](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-239.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-239](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-239.html)
  *
  * The IOAPIC REG_SELECT register is an 8bit register, which is expected to be
  * accessed with 32bit accesses.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-255/main.c b/tests/xsa-255/main.c
index 647de51831bdc2bbbe28f5df083eb079d04a4926..f3db629ed4bfa8ae6aba1f7ba3b17f1a3a0c763e 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-255/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-255/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-255 XSA-255
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-255](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-255.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-255](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-255.html)
  *
  * The Grant Table v2 API has includes a set of status frames, which the guest
  * is expected to map in addition to the regular grant frames.  These frames

diff --git a/tests/xsa-259/main.c b/tests/xsa-259/main.c
index 0432c1320547277c540fc53072e6a4fb5462ebee..7ccb07685b9d4b9f4b4acf6aa1664ea241e5fd68 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-259/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-259/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-259 XSA-259
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-259](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-259.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-259](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-259.html)
  *
  * The Meltdown mitigation work (XPTI) didn't correctly deal with an error
  * path connecting the `int $0x80` special case handing with general exception

diff --git a/tests/xsa-260/main.c b/tests/xsa-260/main.c
index 2ffd7a29b48e7d786edfa23083c68b544c60336a..cdf5274dd5c80b5cf3562c7dbeb4e7e0bd480008 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-260/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-260/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-260 XSA-260
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-260](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-260.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-260](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-260.html)
  *
  * The `mov` and `pop` instructions, when encoded with an @%ss destination
  * register, set the `movss` shadow in hardware, which prevents

diff --git a/tests/xsa-261/main.c b/tests/xsa-261/main.c
index 9bfaa9214aaeb5e910a9a9d52ed2e1d10b4e29cc..524a9542818fc18405ede8f5270ff27cc635bbe2 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-261/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-261/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-261 XSA-261
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-261](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-261.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-261](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-261.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-261, Xen didn't implement IO-APIC interrupt routing for HPET
  * timers properly, and attempting to configure a IRQ above the legacy PIC

diff --git a/tests/xsa-265/main.c b/tests/xsa-265/main.c
index 046faefde21409ee8fbb191e2137ad750c832344..b296ea4fda5a813a0abf5a192fa27059a7182cbe 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-265/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-265/main.c
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-265 XSA-265
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-265](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-264.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-265](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-264.html)
  *
  * One of the fixes for
- * [XSA-260](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=75d6828bc2146d0eea16adc92376951a310d94a7)
+ * [XSA-260](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=75d6828bc2146d0eea16adc92376951a310d94a7)
  * introduced logic to try and prevent livelocks of @#DB exceptions in
  * hypervisor context.  However, it failed to account for the fact that some
  * %dr6 bits are sticky and never cleared by hardware.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-269/main.c b/tests/xsa-269/main.c
index 581709db9224b7ce2e0c3ee3a49bb290be9e3bff..d633d50ea117452f22406d8116138d1806ed594d 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-269/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-269/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-269 XSA-269
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-269](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-269.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-269](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-269.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-269, no reserved bit checking was performed for writes to
  * MSR_DEBUGCTL.  Branch Trace Store isn't virtualised, and must only be

diff --git a/tests/xsa-277/main.c b/tests/xsa-277/main.c
index 1bd06c9e67341fb453722c26948add20d0b55e82..78f2c12ac36b101d001e21304e40c99c43edbf6d 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-277/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-277/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-277 XSA-277
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-277](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-277.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-277](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-277.html)
  *
  * Before XSA-277, an error path in the P2M code left a spinlock held when the
  * guest tried to remove a page which was already not present.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-278/main.c b/tests/xsa-278/main.c
index 919654c2b9b086b546c81472250783b8498e5667..3c1fe4a913a27d9ee9632841e28475aff7e083ee 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-278/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-278/main.c
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-278 XSA-278
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-278](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-278.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-278](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-278.html)
  *
  * Between
- * [ac6a4500b](http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=ac6a4500b2bed47fa135afbf8e4caeb4b3df546d)
+ * [ac6a4500b](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=ac6a4500b2bed47fa135afbf8e4caeb4b3df546d)
  * (Xen 4.9) and XSA-278, Xen incorrectly handled its concept of "in VMX
  * mode", and allowed the use of the VT-x instructions before VMXON had
  * completed.

diff --git a/tests/xsa-279/main.c b/tests/xsa-279/main.c
index c0fa604200d71bcbecb1ee36c19e57be37d41442..fe13296462741300e26bd62a81cdb52ad0a3265f 100644 (file)
--- a/tests/xsa-279/main.c
+++ b/tests/xsa-279/main.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * @page test-xsa-279 XSA-279
  *
- * Advisory: [XSA-279](http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-279.html)
+ * Advisory: [XSA-279](https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-279.html)
  *
  * When `PCID` support was added to Xen to mitigate some of the performance
  * hit from the Meltdown protection, Xen's internal TLB flushing changed from