]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - people/royger/xen.git/commitdiff
x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Sun, 18 Dec 2016 14:20:49 +0000 (14:20 +0000)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tue, 21 Feb 2017 11:06:39 +0000 (11:06 +0000)
hvm_hw_cpu->msr_flags is in fact the VMX dirty bitmap of MSRs needing to be
restored when switching into guest context.  It should never have been part of
the migration state to start with, and Xen must not make any decisions based
on the value seen during restore.

Identify it as obsolete in the header files, consistently save it as zero and
ignore it on restore.

The MSRs must be considered dirty during VMCS creation to cause the proper
defaults of 0 to be visible to the guest.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h

index 894c4575af6f775e0bb23242c40d7d738a779744..79924a5d5f41460a9c7c1b46a1a64401d9b7037d 100644 (file)
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static void svm_save_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
     data->msr_cstar        = vmcb->cstar;
     data->msr_syscall_mask = vmcb->sfmask;
     data->msr_efer         = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer;
-    data->msr_flags        = -1ULL;
+    data->msr_flags        = 0;
 }
 
 
index 5306a48bd8b8c8ef4722335697b8f0e5c5bd8144..4499030d5e373287ca0a2898d76cb41bbb0320ed 100644 (file)
@@ -1127,6 +1127,9 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
             vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
     }
 
+    /* All guest MSR state is dirty. */
+    v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state.flags = ((1u << VMX_MSR_COUNT) - 1);
+
     /* I/O access bitmap. */
     __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap));
     __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap) + PAGE_SIZE);
index 597d7ac47194d1d539ba3029bb03cf5e3e62d00b..af20ff18d33a81f0024b2aff44f61956e9ab3966 100644 (file)
@@ -781,13 +781,12 @@ static int vmx_vmcs_restore(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *c)
 static void vmx_save_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
 {
     struct vmx_msr_state *guest_state = &v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state;
-    unsigned long guest_flags = guest_state->flags;
 
     data->shadow_gs = v->arch.hvm_vmx.shadow_gs;
     data->msr_cstar = v->arch.hvm_vmx.cstar;
 
     /* save msrs */
-    data->msr_flags        = guest_flags;
+    data->msr_flags        = 0;
     data->msr_lstar        = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_LSTAR];
     data->msr_star         = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_STAR];
     data->msr_syscall_mask = guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_SYSCALL_MASK];
@@ -798,7 +797,7 @@ static void vmx_load_cpu_state(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *data)
     struct vmx_msr_state *guest_state = &v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_state;
 
     /* restore msrs */
-    guest_state->flags = data->msr_flags & 7;
+    guest_state->flags = ((1u << VMX_MSR_COUNT) - 1);
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_LSTAR]        = data->msr_lstar;
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_STAR]         = data->msr_star;
     guest_state->msrs[VMX_INDEX_MSR_SYSCALL_MASK] = data->msr_syscall_mask;
index 8d73b51f061e1ad4e5c725d2302a918c635cee6e..419a3b23d44e73f155769ade82a07b20ca73391e 100644 (file)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct hvm_hw_cpu {
     uint64_t shadow_gs;
 
     /* msr content saved/restored. */
-    uint64_t msr_flags;
+    uint64_t msr_flags; /* Obsolete, ignored. */
     uint64_t msr_lstar;
     uint64_t msr_star;
     uint64_t msr_cstar;
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ struct hvm_hw_cpu_compat {
     uint64_t shadow_gs;
 
     /* msr content saved/restored. */
-    uint64_t msr_flags;
+    uint64_t msr_flags; /* Obsolete, ignored. */
     uint64_t msr_lstar;
     uint64_t msr_star;
     uint64_t msr_cstar;