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Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>

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@@ -5,37 +5,50 @@
 <p>This process primarily covers the <a href="http://www.xen.org/products/xenhyp.html">Xen Hypervisor Project</a>. Vulnerabilties reported against other Xen.org projects will be handled on a best effort basis by the relevant Project Lead together with the security team.</p>
 <h2>Specific process</h2>
 <ol type="1">
-<li><p>We request that anyone who discovers a vulnerability in xen.org software reports this by email to security (at) xen (dot) org.</p>
+<li>
+<p>We request that anyone who discovers a vulnerability in xen.org software reports this by email to security (at) xen (dot) org.</p>
 <p>(This also covers the situation where an existing published changeset is retrospectively found to be a security fix)</p></li>
-<li><p>Immediately, and in parallel:</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>Immediately, and in parallel:</p></li>
 <ol type="a">
-<li><p>Those of us on the xen.org team who are aware of the problem will notify security@xen if disclosure wasn't made there already.</p></li>
-<li><p>If the vulnerability is not already public, security@xen will negotiate with discoverer regarding embargo date and disclosure schedule. See below for detailed discussion.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>Those of us on the xen.org team who are aware of the problem will notify security@xen if disclosure wasn't made there already.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>If the vulnerability is not already public, security@xen will negotiate with discoverer regarding embargo date and disclosure schedule. See below for detailed discussion.</p></li>
 </ol>
 <li>Furthermore, also in parallel:</li>
 <ol type="a" start="3">
-<li><p>security@xen will check whether the discoverer, or other people already aware of the problem, have allocated a CVE number.  If not, we will acquire a CVE candidate number ourselves, and make sure that everyone who is aware of the problem is also aware of the CVE number.</p></li>
-<li><p>If we think other software systems (for example, competing hypervisor systems) are likely to be affected by the same vulnerability, we will try to make those other projects aware of the problem and include them in the advisory preparation process.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>security@xen will check whether the discoverer, or other people already aware of the problem, have allocated a CVE number.  If not, we will acquire a CVE candidate number ourselves, and make sure that everyone who is aware of the problem is also aware of the CVE number.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>If we think other software systems (for example, competing hypervisor systems) are likely to be affected by the same vulnerability, we will try to make those other projects aware of the problem and include them in the advisory preparation process.</p></li>
 <p>(This may rely on the other project(s) having documented and responsive security contact points)</p>
-<li><p>We will prepare or check patch(es) which fix the vulnerability.  This would ideally include all relevant backports.  Patches will be tightly targeted on fixing the specific security vulnerability in the smallest, simplest and most reliable way.  Where necessary domain specific experts within the community will be brought in to help with patch preparation.</p></li>
-<li><p>We will determine which systems/configurations/versions are vulnerable, and what the impact of the vulnerability is. Depending on the nature of the vulnerability this may involve sharing information about the vulnerability (in confidence, if the issue is embargoed) with hardware vendors and/or other software projects.</p></li>
-<li><p>We will write a Xen advisory including information from (b)-(f)</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>We will prepare or check patch(es) which fix the vulnerability.  This would ideally include all relevant backports.  Patches will be tightly targeted on fixing the specific security vulnerability in the smallest, simplest and most reliable way.  Where necessary domain specific experts within the community will be brought in to help with patch preparation.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>We will determine which systems/configurations/versions are vulnerable, and what the impact of the vulnerability is. Depending on the nature of the vulnerability this may involve sharing information about the vulnerability (in confidence, if the issue is embargoed) with hardware vendors and/or other software projects.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>We will write a Xen advisory including information from (b)-(f)</p></li>
 </ol>
-<li><p><strong>Advisory pre-release:</strong></p>
+<li>
+<p><strong>Advisory pre-release:</strong></p>
 <p>This occurs only if the advisory is embargoed (ie, the problem is not already public):</p>
 <p>As soon as our advisory is available, we will send it, including patches, to members of the Xen security pre-disclosure list. For more information about this list, see below.</p>
 <p>At this stage the advisory will be clearly marked with the embargo date.</p>
 </li>
-<li><p><strong>Advisory public release:</strong></p>
+<li>
+<p><strong>Advisory public release:</strong></p>
 <p>At the embargo date we will publish the advisory, and push bugfix changesets to public revision control trees.</p>
 <p>Public advisories will be posted to xen-devel, xen-users and xen-annnounce and will be added to the
 <a href="http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Security_Announcements">Security Announcements wiki page</a>.</p>
 <p>Copies will also be sent to the pre-disclosure list.</p>
 </li>
-<li><p><strong>Updates</strong></p>
+<li>
+<p><strong>Updates</strong></p>
 <p>If new information or better patches become available, or we discover mistakes, we may issue an amended (revision 2 or later) public advisory.  This will also be sent to the pre-disclosure list.</p>
 </li>
-<li><p><strong>Post embargo transparency:</strong></p>
+<li>
+<p><strong>Post embargo transparency:</strong></p>
 <p>During an embargo period the Xen.org security response team may be required to make potentially controverial decisions in private, since they cannot confer with the community without breaking the embargo. The security team will attempt to make such decisions following the guidance of this document and where necessary their own best judgement. Following the embargo period any such decisions will be disclosed to the community in the interests of transparency and to help provide guidance should a similar decision be required in the future.</p>
 </li>
 </ol>
@@ -43,8 +56,10 @@
 <p>If a vulnerability is not already public, we would like to notify significant distributors and operators of Xen so that they can prepare patched software in advance. This will help minimise the degree to which there are Xen users who are vulnerable but can't get patches.</p> 
 <p>As discussed, we will negotiate with discoverers about disclosure schedule. Our usual starting point for that negotiation, unless there are reasons to diverge from this, would be:</p>
 <ol type="1">    
-<li><p>One working week between notification arriving at security@xen and the issue of our own advisory to our predisclosure list.  We will use this time to gather information and prepare our advisory, including required patches.</p></li>    
-<li><p>Two working weeks between issue of our advisory to our predisclosure list and publication.</p></li>
+<li>
+<p>One working week between notification arriving at security@xen and the issue of our own advisory to our predisclosure list.  We will use this time to gather information and prepare our advisory, including required patches.</p></li>    
+<li>
+<p>Two working weeks between issue of our advisory to our predisclosure list and publication.</p></li>
 </ol>
 <p>When a discoverer reports a problem to us and requests longer delays than we would consider ideal, we will honour such a request if reasonable. If a discoverer wants an accelerated disclosure compared to what we would prefer, we naturally do not have the power to insist that a discoverer waits for us to be ready and will honour the date specified by the discoverer.</p>    
 <p>Naturally, if a vulnerability is being exploited in the wild we will make immediately public release of the advisory and patch(es) and expect others to do likewise.</p>