Other than in the feature sets, where we indeed want to offer the
feature even if not enumerated on hardware, we shouldn't dictate the
feature being available if tool stack or host admin have decided to not
expose it (for whatever [questionable?] reason). That feature set side
override is sufficient to achieve the intended guest side safety
property (in offering - by default - STIBP independent of actual
availability in hardware).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
recalculate_xstate(p);
recalculate_misc(p);
- /*
- * Override STIBP to match IBRS. Guests can safely use STIBP
- * functionality on non-HT hardware, but can't necesserily protect
- * themselves from SP2/Spectre/Branch Target Injection if STIBP is hidden
- * on HT-capable hardware.
- */
- p->feat.stibp = p->feat.ibrsb;
-
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->cache.raw); ++i )
{
if ( p->cache.subleaf[i].type >= 1 &&
XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4FMAPS, 9*32+ 3) /*A AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRSB, 9*32+26) /*A IBRS and IBPB support (used by Intel) */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A! STIBP */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A STIBP */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS, 9*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSBD, 9*32+31) /*A MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */