Check for non-canonical guest RIP before attempting to execute sysret.
If sysret is executed with a non-canonical value in RCX, Intel CPUs
take the fault in ring0, but we will necessarily already have switched
to the the user's stack pointer.
This is a security vulnerability, XSA-7 / CVE-2012-0217.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir.xen@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25480:
76eaf5966c05
xen-unstable date: Tue Jun 12 11:33:40 2012 +0100
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
jz iret_exit_to_guest
+ /* Don't use SYSRET path if the return address is not canonical. */
+ movq 8(%rsp),%rcx
+ sarq $47,%rcx
+ incl %ecx
+ cmpl $1,%ecx
+ ja .Lforce_iret
+
addq $8,%rsp
popq %rcx # RIP
popq %r11 # CS
sysretq
1: sysretl
+.Lforce_iret:
+ /* Mimic SYSRET behavior. */
+ movq 8(%rsp),%rcx # RIP
+ movq 24(%rsp),%r11 # RFLAGS
ALIGN
/* No special register assumptions. */
iret_exit_to_guest: