]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commit
IOMMU: default to always quarantining PCI devices
authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tue, 26 Nov 2019 17:03:41 +0000 (18:03 +0100)
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tue, 26 Nov 2019 17:03:41 +0000 (18:03 +0100)
commite4899550ff7834e1ea5dfbbfb1c618f64e247761
treea766f34fb7d05bcde96a5f25ae42e6b475e5b31b
parent37139f1df7fc07b9226e54202a26dc2b95a68a38
IOMMU: default to always quarantining PCI devices

XSA-302 relies on the use of libxl's "assignable-add" feature to prepare
devices to be assigned to untrusted guests.

Unfortunately, this is not considered a strictly required step for
device assignment. The PCI passthrough documentation on the wiki
describes alternate ways of preparing devices for assignment, and
libvirt uses its own ways as well. Hosts where these alternate methods
are used will still leave the system in a vulnerable state after the
device comes back from a guest.

Default to always quarantining PCI devices, but provide a command line
option to revert back to prior behavior (such that people who both
sufficiently trust their guests and want to be able to use devices in
Dom0 again after they had been in use by a guest wouldn't need to
"manually" move such devices back from DomIO to Dom0).

This is XSA-306.

Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
master commit: ba2ab00bbb8c74e311a252d816d68dee47c779a0
master date: 2019-11-26 14:15:01 +0100
docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
xen/include/xen/iommu.h