]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commit
xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Fri, 26 Aug 2016 08:32:01 +0000 (10:32 +0200)
committerJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fri, 26 Aug 2016 08:32:01 +0000 (10:32 +0200)
commit462f714b1c776cad5b85132033fbf2f04d12d77c
treed6b7de718f8ef4ea79ca01559c0ff63f4d8b73ba
parentde1d9ea33caf020b610d57e425ccde3b2b8af962
xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

PoD is supposed to be entirely transparent to guest, but this interface has
been left exposed for a long time.

The use of PoD requires careful co-ordination by the toolstack with the
XENMEM_{get,set}_pod_target hypercalls, and xenstore ballooning target.  The
best a guest can do without toolstack cooperation crash.

Furthermore, there are combinations of features (e.g. c/s c63868ff "libxl:
disallow PCI device assignment for HVM guest when PoD is enabled") which a
toolstack might wish to explicitly prohibit (in this case, because the two
simply don't function in combination).  In such cases, the guest mustn't be
able to subvert the configuration chosen by the toolstack.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 2a99aa99fc84a45f505f84802af56b006d14c52e
master date: 2016-08-19 18:40:11 +0100
xen/common/memory.c