]> xenbits.xensource.com Git - xen.git/commit
x86: Expose more MSR_ARCH_CAPS to hwdom
authorJason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Tue, 19 Jul 2022 20:08:15 +0000 (16:08 -0400)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Thu, 3 Aug 2023 18:14:19 +0000 (19:14 +0100)
commit155d38c76c3f04a20f7603e533a5ab247dd6d3ea
tree6acc39c4333bd62643a8b406becce8409d18c339
parent62549f81869638a65efe879d23c9c4573b7e45d4
x86: Expose more MSR_ARCH_CAPS to hwdom

commit e46474278a0e ("x86/intel: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0") started
exposing MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0.  More bits in MSR_ARCH_CAPS have since
been defined, but they haven't been exposed.  Update the list to allow
them through.

As one example, this allows a Linux Dom0 to know that it has the
appropriate microcode via FB_CLEAR.  Notably, and with the updated
microcode, this changes dom0's
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data changes from:

  "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode; SMT Host state unknown"

to:

  "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT Host state unknown"

This exposes the MMIO Stale Data and Intel Branch History Injection
(BHI) controls as well as the page size change MCE issue bit.

Fixes: commit 2ebe8fe9b7e0 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for MMIO Stale Data controls")
Fixes: commit cea9ae062295 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for new Intel BHI controls")
Fixes: commit 59e89cdabc71 ("x86/vtx: Disable executable EPT superpages to work around CVE-2018-12207")
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit e83cd54611fec5b7a539fa1281a14319143490e6)
xen/arch/x86/msr.c
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h